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Cheap and Cheerful: The European Ford Capri Print E-mail

Tags: 1960s | 1970s | 1980s | British cars | Capri | Ford | German cars | Mustang | pony cars

Written by Aaron Severson   
Saturday, 20 February 2010 00:00

The Ford Capri, launched in 1969, was Europe's answer to the Ford Mustang, and one of the first fruits of Ford's newly unified European operations. This week, we look at the birth of "the car you always promised yourself," and consider the origins of Ford of Europe.

1976 Mercury Capri badge

THE FIRST EUROPEAN FORDS

To understand the history of the Ford Capri, we must step back some years to look at the origins of Ford's European operations.

The immortal Model T, launched in 1908, was the car that put America on wheels, and it also had obvious appeal for the European market. In October 1911, Ford established its first overseas assembly plant in Manchester, England, followed five years later by a French operation, based in Bordeaux. By the mid-twenties, Ford had plants in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Turkey. It would have even more by the end of the following decade.

At first, Ford's European operations were just assembly plants, building "Tin Lizzies" from CKD (complete knocked down) kits manufactured in Dearborn. By the late twenties, however, it was becoming clear that American products were not well suited for many European markets. A major problem was engine size; many U.S. engines ran afoul of local taxable horsepower rules, some of which had been conceived specifically to exclude Yankee imports. In Britain, for example, the Ford Model A's 3.3 L (200 cu. in.) four had a Royal Auto Club taxable horsepower rating of 24 HP, more than some Rolls-Royces. With an annual tax of £1 per RAC horsepower (about $5 at the time, the equivalent of perhaps $65 today), that was not an economically viable proposition for many motorists. Sales suffered accordingly, compelling Ford to offer a de-bored, 2.0 L (122 cu. in.) version with a more affordable 14.9 HP rating.

Aside from the need for products better suited to European conditions, Henry Ford had grand ambitions of building a European empire to rival Ford's North American operations. His "1928 Plan" called for the creation of a full-fledged European manufacturing capacity, centered on a new English factory in Dagenham, followed by a German plant in Cologne-Niehl. Those operations would be managed by a new holding company, Ford Motor Company Ltd.

The plan was far ahead of its time, but it was undone by the 1929 stock market crash and the onset of the Depression. By the time the Dagenham and Cologne factories came on line in 1931, the economies of Europe were in ruins. Many nations imposed stringent import tariffs, which made any kind of transnational manufacturing alliance difficult. Money for new cars was scarce, which left Ford's American products even more difficult to sell.

Ford hastily concocted its first true European car, the Model Y, in early 1932. Designed in Dearborn, it was nonetheless tailored to the needs of the British market, with an 8 HP rating and attractively low price. A German version followed, and the subsequent Model C spawned both German and French variants.

1934 Ford Model Y front 3q
The Ford Model Y had a 933 cc (57 cu. in.) flathead four. It made about 24 hp (18 kW), although its RAC taxable horsepower rating was 8 HP. With an annual tax of £8 (about $40 at contemporary exchange rates), it was much cheaper to run than a Model A, which cost £24 ($120) per year. (Photo © 2009 Lars-Göran Lindgren; used under a Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 2.5 Generic license)

The advent of European products did not mean a common European organization. Although Ford's British, French, and German products had many similarities, commonality was almost nonexistent, and the different national organizations were direct competitors in some export markets. It was a far cry from the unified empire Henry Ford had imagined in 1928.

FORD'S EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

Henry Ford II, who took over his grandfather's company in 1946, shared the elder Ford's global ambitions. As early as 1950, Henry II declared his desire to unify Ford's European operations into a single organization, based in England. In the forties and fifties, however, Henry was busy rebuilding Ford's U.S. operations, which had fallen into chaos toward the end of his grandfather's reign.

As a result, when civilian automobile production resumed after the war, Ford's British, French, and German subsidiaries once again went their separate ways, with distinct products, different engines, and separate manufacturing operations. Ford sold its French subsidiary to Simca in 1954, but Ford of Britain (FoB) and Ford Werke AG (Ford of Germany, or FoG) remained direct rivals.

By the early sixties, this situation was becoming untenable. Ford's market share was quite high, but it was facing tougher competition, particularly from BMC's new Mini. It no longer made sense for FoB and FoG not to cooperate.

In 1964, FoB and FoG launched their first collaborative effort, the Ford Transit van, which proved very successful. Henry Ford II subsequently ordered John Andrews, the American-born chairman of FoG, to prepare a study on unifying the British and German organizations. By that point, Henry had become thoroughly exasperated with the balkanized nature of Ford's European operations, which he saw as not only a waste of resources, but also a challenge to his authority.

At a meeting in Paris in June 1967, shortly after Ford's second victory at Le Mans, Henry named John Andrews the first chairman of Ford of Europe. The new organization would be based in FoB's offices in Essex, east of London. Stanley Gillen, the head of FoB, became Andrews' deputy. Henry warned Andrews that he expected him to make it work.

1964 Ford Consul Capri front 3q
From 1961 to 1964, Ford of Britain offered its first European Capri, a coupe version of the Consul Classic saloon, with an American-style pillarless hardtop roof. Most of these early Capris shared the Classic's 1.5 L (79 cu. in.) four, which provided sleepy performance. Sales were disappointing, and it was dropped in 1964. (Photo © 2009 Martin Alford; used by permission)

The merger was inevitably contentious, complicated by serious culture clashes, language barriers, and the 400-mile (640-kilometer) distance between Essex and Ford of Germany headquarters in Cologne. (Ford eventually established its own private airline to ferry senior staff back and forth, judging it cheaper than the cost of commercial air travel.) In the short term, Andrews and Gillen determined that it was not practical or economical to impose across-the-board commonality. Aside from the need to amortize existing tooling and facilities, they did not want to undermine FoB and FoG's respective strengths.

Ford of Europe's first post-merger product was the 1968 Escort, but that was a wholly British design, completed before unification. The new organization's first truly collaborative product would be a sporty new coupe called Capri.


Comments (5)
  • Tony LaHood

    Enlightening article, Aaron, and well-written as always. I never did understand why the marketing of very good (if esoteric) captive imports was assigned to divisions whose dealerships their target buyers pretty much found repellent. Opel never had a chance while yoked to Buick, just as Mercury hadn't a clue how to sell Capri.

    Speaking of which, I hope you'll write about the Merkur XR4Ti/Scorpio debacle.

  • Administrator

    I think many of these pairings reflect the push-me/pull-you relationship between automakers and dealers. Dealers tend to get pushy when they don't have something to sell in a particular class, and they don't necessarily think very far ahead -- if you're selling cars, your priority is selling cars now, not three years from now.

    The Buick/Opel pairing came about during the Eisenhower recession in 1957. Buick was in a bad way at that point. They had let their production capacity overwhelm their quality control (gee, does that sound familiar?), the public was bored with the styling of the '57 and disliked the '58, and sales plummeted. As the recession deepened, mid-priced cars in general became abruptly unpopular. I'm assuming that Buick's sales organization got a lot of screaming from dealers that they had nothing to sell. Buick started working on the first Y-body Special, but it wasn't going to be ready for a couple of years, so the Opel Olympia Rekord was a stopgap. Buick dealers sold a modest number of them, but they didn't like the idea of investing a lot of money in parts and training to fix them, and individual salesmen would rather sell a Buick, with the prospect of a much higher commission. The same happened with the Vauxhalls sold by Pontiac.

    (By the late sixties, Opel would have been a better fit with Pontiac, but I'm not sure Pontiac dealers would have done any better selling them than Buick dealers were.)

    With the Capri, you can see the logic, just as you can see why it didn't work. If they'd badged it as a Ford, it would have competed directly with the Pinto, the Maverick, and the Mustang; Ford already had a problem with each new model cannibalizing its existing products. Lincoln-Mercury was a different story. L-M was moving the Cougar into the personal luxury class, so it was aimed more at the Monte Carlo and Grand Prix than the Mustang, and Mercury didn't have a Pinto equivalent. (The Bobcat didn't arrive until 1975.) I'm sure the idea of bringing over the Capri 1600 seemed like a great way to kill two birds with one stone -- a junior sporty car to fill the gap left by the Cougar, and a compact economy car to fill in for the Pinto.

    I think the Capri suffered two major problems in the U.S., aside from a more crowded market. First, Matt McLaughlin, who was L-M general manager when it was introduced, didn't think Mercury should do sporty cars. He felt it was too much of a stretch from Mercury's existing brand. Second, there was the inevitable "not invented here" problem. If L-M had marketed the Capri the way it was marketed in Europe -- with a fuller range of models and engines -- it could have been very successful here, but I don't think L-M (either the division or the dealers) ever really saw it as their car.

  • Stéphane Dumas

    Very good article about the European Capri. I spotted a interesting variant of the Ford Taunus TC(who borrowed lots of styling cues from the Cortina MkIII) in Argentina, a coupe version in fastback style similar in design to the Capri, http://www.clubtaunus.com.ar/English/History_Taunus-Arg.htm I don't know what they didn't used the Capri moniker there however.

  • Mervyn Scott

    The Capri wasn't really viewed as a bona fide sports car , in the same way as an MGB-GT , since in basic 1300 or 1600 form it had no performance and little glamour. The 3-Litre V6 was a serious piece of kit, but lesser versions were simply fancy Cortinas , and they didn't have the competition pedigree or street cred of the Cortina.

  • Administrator

    Well, the analogy to the American Mustang is quite pronounced. You could make the Mustang into a credible competition car, but the basic six-cylinder Mustang was little more than a sportier-looking Falcon Futura, with less rear-seat and boot space. (The Mustang's body had less structural commonality with the Falcon than the Capri did with the Cortina, but in hardware and specifications, the point remains.) Even in the States, few people would have called the Mustang a proper sports car; in the vernacular of the time, it was a "sporty car," a subtle but important distinction.

    Where the analogy breaks down a bit is in the fact that, as you say, Ford managed to establish a fair pedigree for the Cortina, with the Lotus Cortina and GT. By contrast, while the American Falcon became a serious rally competitor in '63-'64, Ford's efforts to sell a performance-oriented Falcon in the U.S. came up short. (It would fall to Ford Australia to make that particular equation work.)

    It would be interesting to compare the sales for the sporty Cortinas to those of the lesser Capris. There are always those who are more interested in performance than style and vice versa, and I would be curious to see which was larger at that point. I would suspect the Capri, but I don't know offhand.

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