Magnificent Kludge: The ‘Rope-Drive’ 1961–1963 Pontiac Tempest


From 1961 to 1963, the “senior compact” Pontiac Tempest had a novel powertrain layout featuring a front engine and a rear transaxle, connected with an unusual flexible driveshaft known as the “rope drive.”

What price novelty? If you walked into a Pontiac dealer in November 1960, the answer was $2,167, the list price of one of the most unusual American cars of its era: the all-new 1961 Pontiac Tempest. In this installment of Ate Up With Motor, we’ll take a look at the short career of the “rope-drive” 1961–1963 Pontiac Tempest and the hows and whys of its peculiar front-engine/rear-transaxle powertrain.

1963 Pontiac Tempest Le Mans convertible (red) grille closeup by AlfvanBeem (CC0 1.0 - AS recrop)
(Photo: “1963 Pontiac 2217 DR-90-46 p3” by AlfvanBeem, which was dedicated to the public domain by the photographer under a CC0 1.0 Universal (CC0 1.0) Public Domain Dedication; this version was recropped and resized 2022 by Aaron Severson)

Detroit Compacts Revisited

As the fifties became the 1960s, it appeared that American automotive engineering was settling into a comfortable routine, leaving behind a brief flurry of experimentation with features like air suspension and fuel injection. The “standard” American car of the time was a big three-box notchback (coupe, sedan, or two- or four-door hardtop) or a station wagon, with body-on-frame construction, independent front suspension, an open propeller shaft driving a live rear axle, drum brakes, and a choice of carbureted cast iron V-8 or inline six-cylinder engines. A few manufacturers chose unitized construction over body-on-frame, and Buick and AMC still clung for a while longer to their traditional torque tube drive, but such variations only served to emphasize that most American cars were more alike than different in all but looks. Not even the contemporary Chevrolet Corvette had independent rear suspension or disc brakes.

It’s not surprising, therefore, that when the latest wave of smaller “compact” and “intermediate” models arrived for the 1960 and 1961 model years, they generally hewed closely to the status quo except in size and more widespread use of unit construction. The case in point was the popular new Ford Falcon, which quickly emerged as the segment leader in part because it did nothing to test buyers’ appetite for novelty.

1960 Ford Falcon four-door sedan (Belmont blue) by Aaron Severson (author photo)

The original Ford Falcon was not a notably interesting car to look at, to drive, or to examine from an engineering standpoint (although its six-cylinder engine’s lightweight iron casting techniques foreshadowed an industry trend), but it was the clear sales winner among domestic compacts of this period. (author photo)

By far the most notorious exception was the Chevrolet Corvair, which was less a scaled-down big Chevrolet than a scaled-up, Americanized take on certain popular European economy cars. The Corvair, as most readers already know, featured a rear-mounted, air-cooled flat six; a rear transaxle; and independent rear suspension by swing axles, whose shortcomings have made the Corvair controversial to this day.

1960 Chevrolet Corvair 700 coupe (light blue) by Aaron Severson (author photo)

The original Chevrolet Corvair was by no means a strange-looking car, and its sporty styling was one of its leading virtues. From an engineering standpoint, however, it was with little question the most unorthodox American car of 1960, which was not necessarily to its credit. Its handling shortcomings, though eventually rectified, resulted in lawsuits and made the Corvair a cause célèbre for the emerging automotive safety lobby. (author photo)

A year after the Corvair came the other great departure from Detroit engineering orthodoxy: the 1961 Pontiac Tempest. Sharing some pieces with the Corvair (including its swing-axle rear suspension), the Tempest was if anything even more iconoclastic, mounting its engine up front and its transmission in the rear, connected by an unusual curved, flexible driveshaft (the eponymous “rope-drive,” of which we’ll have more to say presently). The engine too was unusual, a big water-cooled slant four of rather intemperately large displacement, essentially a Pontiac V-8 shorn of one cylinder bank.

Still more curious was the fact that the Tempest shared its unitized body shell with two other GM compacts, the Buick Special and Oldsmobile F-85. All three of these “senior compacts” were almost identical in size and similar in appearance, but the Buick and the Oldsmobile had conventional FR layouts, live rear axles, and a lightweight aluminum V-8 engine (which was also optional on the Tempest).

1961 Pontiac Tempest four-door sedan (red) front 208352 (General Motors LLC / GMMA 26150)

From head on, a casual observer might mistakenly assume the 1961 Pontiac Tempest was simply a full-size ’59 Pontiac that shrank in the wash. (Photo: General Motors LLC)

Why would Pontiac build such an unusual car that looked so much like its nearest corporate relatives and yet was so unlike them mechanically? When the Tempest debuted, Pontiac officials spoke at length about the many advantages of its novel layout, but while these made for good copy, they were mostly rationalizations. As is often the case, the real story was both simpler and far more complicated.

The Import Problem and the Eisenhower Recession

As we’ve previously written, the U.S. auto industry had toyed with compact cars of various kinds for years, and there had been a brief flurry of them in the early fifties, beginning with the first Nash Rambler in 1950, followed by Kaiser’s Henry J, the Hudson Jet, and the Aero-Willys. This proliferation proved premature; American buyers who had clamored for smaller, more economical cars were less enthusiastic upon realizing that “smaller” did not necessarily mean meaningfully cheaper. By the end of 1955, only the Rambler survived, and the fledgling American Motors Corporation soon hedged its bets with a somewhat larger midsize Rambler model.

The situation soon shifted again, in surprisingly short order. The boom that followed the lifting of Korean War restrictions, which led to record new car sales for 1955, was not sustainable, and by mid-1957, the U.S. economy was slipping into recession. That downturn coincided with the introduction of some of the American auto industry’s biggest and glitziest new models to date, notable declines in build quality, and a new wave of pop sociology (perhaps best exemplified by Vance Packard’s book The Hidden Persuaders, first published that summer) warning that the advertising industry was using sophisticated psychological trickery to sell Americans an array of products they neither needed nor really even wanted — including ever larger and more expensive automobiles.

1958 Pontiac Bonneville Sport Coupe (copper and white) front 3q by AlfvanBeem (CC0 1.0)

The Pontiac Bonneville debuted in 1957 as a limited-edition convertible and became a regular model line for 1958. Big, glitzy, and powerful, the 1958 Bonneville was out of step with the tastes of what proved to be a recessionary year for Detroit and for Pontiac. Also, its 4.5-inch (114.3-mm) longer wheelbase couldn’t hide its pronounced resemblance to the 1958 Chevrolet Impala that shared its body shell (though not its 370 cu. in. (6,054 cc) Pontiac “Tempest 395” V-8). Sales for the two-door Bonneville Sport Coupe hardtop totaled 9,144, a mere 4.2 percent of Pontiac’s 1958 sales, which were down a worrying 35 percent from 1957. (Photo: “1958 Pontiac Bonneville photo2” by AlfvanBeem, which was dedicated to the public domain by the photographer under a CC0 1.0 Universal (CC0 1.0) Public Domain Dedication; it was resized 2022 by Aaron Severson)

In this climate, a growing number of American buyers again looked to compact cars — not simply out of parsimony or sticker shock at new car prices, but as a reaction against the perceived excesses of Detroit and Madison Avenue. Some bought Ramblers, validating AMC chairman George Romney’s decision to consolidate around the Rambler brand and his oft-quoted derision of thirsty, overstuffed “Detroit dinosaurs.” Others turned to imported small cars, including a certain resilient German-made insect from Wolfsburg, whose U.S. sales began to take off around this time.

It would be another decade before most Big Three auto executives would be willing to publicly acknowledge that import buyers were anything other than “kooks,” much less that small imported cars represented any real commercial threat, but the trend was concerning. The imports’ collective market share doubled from 1956 to 1957, and would more than double again for 1958. Economic downturns were one thing; seeing middle-class buyers who in the normal order of things “should” have been driving a Pontiac or an Oldsmobile instead pass by in a new Volkswagen Beetle was something else.

How concerned the leaders of GM’s mid-price Buick, Oldsmobile, and Pontiac divisions were about these trends is no longer entirely clear, but those divisions’ franchise holders were apparently quite alarmed — so much so that in late 1957, thousands of Buick and Pontiac dealers signed up to sell compact cars imported from GM’s British and German subsidiaries: the Vauxhall Victor and Opel Olympia Rekord. Clearly, something more substantial would have to be done, and quickly.

1959 Vauxhall Victor FA (blue with white roof) front 3q by Steve Glover (CC BY 2.0)

The Vauxhall Victor, a product of GM’s British subsidiary, found its way into some Pontiac showrooms beginning in 1958, with U.S. prices starting at $1,988. With 55 gross horsepower (about 41 kW), its 1,508 cc (92 cu. in.) pushrod four could push the Victor to 50 mph (80 km/h) in about 18 seconds, which was sprightly for an English family car of the time, but rather sluggish by American standards. Reaching 60 mph (97 km/h) took 26 to 28 seconds, and contemporary American highway speeds of 45–55 mph (72–88 km/h) coincided with a period of unpleasant engine vibration. (Photo: “Vauxhall Victor FA (1959)” by Steve Glover, which is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic (CC BY 2.0) license)

The Shared Body Problem

For what happened next to make sense, it’s important to understand that during this period, each of GM’s individual automotive divisions enjoyed substantial, though not unlimited, operational autonomy. The divisions didn’t manufacture all of their own components by any means, but they each had their own engineering, manufacturing, and assembly facilities, and each had ultimate responsibility for the direction of their own products and marketing. Senior management occasionally sought to dictate product or engineering decisions, but these attempts were usually met with resentment and recalcitrance.

To be sure, the automotive divisions routinely shared body shells, which reduced unit costs and allowed quicker amortization of the costly tooling needed to produce a steel car or truck body. However, GM had the most sophisticated shared-body program in the world, and the corporation typically allowed the divisions considerable budgetary leeway for individual styling. If there were occasional similarities in roofline or overall proportions, a Buick was still a Buick and a Pontiac was still a Pontiac, each with its own powertrains and various unique features. Moreover, the divisions regarded one another as competitors. The last thing any of them wanted was to have to offer the same corporate white-label product under different names, like cans of generic supermarket peas.

Yet, it appeared in 1957–1958 that this would be the price of responding to the import threat. Worse, at least from the perspective of the mid-price divisions, it was Chevrolet that forced the issue.

1960 Chevrolet Corvair 700 coupe (light blue) rear 3q by Aaron Severson (author photo)

When the Corvair debuted, Chevrolet hadn’t offered an air-cooled car since the early twenties, and the results had not been felicitous, to say the least, which made the Corvair both a commercial and technical gamble for Chevrolet. (author photo)

As we’ve previously discussed, the project that became the Chevrolet Corvair had been in development, in some secrecy, since 1955, an expression of the engineering fascinations of Edward N. Cole, then Chevrolet chief engineer and subsequently that division’s general manager. The start of the recession and the import boom gave Cole the leverage to “sell” his air-cooled, rear-engined car to senior management in the fall of 1957, in no small part because the project was already far enough along that it could be made ready for production in only two years.

The problem was that the Chevrolet compact would be a truly all-new car, sharing little with existing Chevrolet or GM products. That would make it more expensive to build, reducing profit margins and making it harder to keep prices competitive. Short of starting over with a more conventional design, which would have involved more delays, the obvious answer was to spread the development costs around by getting the other divisions to offer their own versions.

This prospect did not go over well. Outside of Chevrolet, there was little enthusiasm for the idea of an air-cooled rear engine. GM president Jack Gordon and chairman Harlow Curtice had reservations, and the general managers of Buick, Oldsmobile, and Pontiac were all opposed to the idea. Since the public reaction was still to be determined, it was also commercially dicey, so there were limits to how far the corporation was prepared to force the issue.

1960 Chevrolet Corvair 700 coupe Turbo-Air 6 engine by Aaron Severson (author photo)

The Corvair’s “Turbo-Air 6” was a horizontally opposed six, initially offering 80 gross horsepower and 125 lb-ft (about 60 kW and 157 N-m) from 140 cu. in. (2,287 cc). (Net output was a modest 65 hp and 110 lb-ft (about 48.5 kW and 138.1 N-m).) Air-cooled flat-sixes were almost unknown in automotive applications at the time the Corvair debuted; the Porsche 911 was still several years in the future. (author photo)

However, the corporation was evidently very concerned about the tooling costs of the all-new compact body shell. Shared bodies were a basic tenet of the GM philosophy; the cost of tooling was enormous, and sharing as much of that expense as widely as possible was essential to profitability.

Eventually, there was a compromise: The compact program would include four cars, all sharing a new unitized Fisher Body shell. Chevrolet and Pontiac were to share the air-cooled rear engine, while the Oldsmobile and Buick cars, codenamed X-100, would have a more conventional front-engine/rear-drive layout, sharing an all-new aluminum V-8, developed by the Engineering Staff to be built by Buick. Despite the differences in powertrain layout, the corporation wanted as much mechanical commonality as possible, with engineering and manufacturing responsibilities to be divided among the divisions. Chevrolet would be first to market, with the others following a year later for 1961.

XP-76 Holden-Pontiac fiberglass model rear 3q D-20005 (General Motors LLC / GMMA 26150)

Like the Corvair on which it was closely based, some early development of the rear-engined Pontiac compact (XP-76) was attributed to Holden, GM’s Australian subsidiary, although this full-size fiberglass model, photographed in August 1958, carries “Pontiac Polaris” identification. We don’t have complete dimensions for it, but they were presumably about the same as the 1960 Corvair, which was 180 inches (4,572 mm) long and 66.9 inches (1,669 mm) wide on a 108-inch (2,743-mm) wheelbase. About three weeks after this photo was taken, this same model was photographed again wearing slightly different trim and Oldsmobile identification, badged “Sixty-Six,” a designation Oldsmobile had last used in 1948. (Photo: General Motors LLC)

In a later era, or at another company, this plan would have been unremarkable, but at the time, it was a bitter pill for the mid-price divisions, who were not entirely convinced that the project was worth their time in the first place. Even if they accepted the need for a compact model, this was not the direction they would have gone if left to their own devices. The divisions weren’t keen on unit construction, for one — it limited styling flexibility and transmitted more noise, vibration, and harshness (NVH) than body-on-frame construction — and they complained that the planned 108-inch (2,743-mm) wheelbase was too short. The corporation eventually conceded the latter point and authorized a stretched version of the new unitized shell with a 112-inch (2,845-mm) wheelbase, known as the Y-body, for Buick and Oldsmobile, though not Pontiac, at least at first.

Pontiac Takes an Inch

For Pontiac management, the compact project represented not only an unpalatable “top-down” management directive, but also a potentially serious existential threat.

Throughout its history, perhaps the most serious challenge Pontiac faced was differentiating itself from Chevrolet. Pontiac had other rivals, of course, including Oldsmobile and Buick as well as non-GM mid-price brands like Mercury and Dodge, but Chevrolet was the most persistent foe, and arguably the most dangerous, thanks to its larger dealer base and the economies of scale offered by its greater production volume. To keep Chevrolet from eating their lunch, Pontiac management and Pontiac dealers fought for every advantage, even symbolic distinctions like offering an extra inch of wheelbase over a comparable Chevrolet. Fortunately, in the late fifties, Pontiac still had an edge on Chevrolet in a number of areas, including its own larger engines with more horsepower, optional four-speed Hydra-Matic rather than the two-speed Chevrolet Powerglide, and subsequently the much-ballyhooed “Wide-Track” stance.

XP-76 Holden-Pontiac fiberglass model rear D-20006 (General Motors LLC / GMMA 26150)

It’s not difficult to see why Pontiac management was wary of the XP-76, which was very obviously based on the Corvair. A subsequent mockup, badged “Ventura” and photographed in April 1959, substituted “frenched” oval taillights, but the net effect was about the same. (Photo: General Motors LLC)

As planned, the new compact — which didn’t yet have an official name, although the full-size clay models carried either “Ventura” or “Polaris” identification — would eliminate most of those distinctions. Pontiac would be chained to a Chevrolet “package” and a Chevrolet powertrain, with little to set the Pontiac version apart from its bowtie-wearing sibling except a few Pontiac styling cues and different trim. In the not-too-distant future, that would become the division’s primary modus operandi (and was already the norm for the Canadian market), but Pontiac management of the late fifties regarded the prospect with dismay. Although we now think of that period as the beginning of a Pontiac renaissance under recently minted general manager Semon “Bunkie” Knudsen and chief engineer E.M. (Pete) Estes, they were still trying to convince the public and a skeptical dealer base that the previously moribund division was finally back on track. The last thing the division or its dealers wanted was to have to shove a made-over Corvair clone down the unwilling throats of Pontiac franchise holders.

Upper management was not wholly unsympathetic to these concerns, but the price tag for the whole project was steadily escalating as the envisioned commonality between the four cars diminished. The corporation was simply not willing to put up any more money for Pontiac to differentiate its compact from the Corvair.

However, “no additional money” was not the same as “no.” Like the other automotive divisions, Pontiac had its own tooling and engineering budgets. Much of that money was already earmarked for the division’s full-size models, but there might be a little bit to spare for something else, if it was cheap enough and clever enough.


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  1. Good job on the airplane ID- indeed an Aero Commander, I believe a ‘500U’ model, the ancestor to the later ‘Shrike’ made famous by R.A. ‘Bob’ Hoover.

    Thanks for a very informative and well researched read! Good years for aviation and autos…

  2. Another good job, up to your usual standards.

    As you point out, the Corvair Monza sold much better than the base model. It’s more or less a truism that the upgrades would have been more profitable than the basic car. With the stipulation that hindsight is 20/20, Chevrolet could have taken a lesson from the nicely trimmed Nash Rambler.

    If I didn’t already know that Vauxhall was a subsidiary of an American automaker, the Victor’s styling would lead me to suspect it.

    1. Deciding how to position a car in terms of base price is complicated, and I don’t want to be TOO dismissive of that. It’s clear that base price can function as a psychological barrier, and it’s not a stretch to concede that the same 1960 compact buyer willing to add $299 worth of options to a $2,000 car might have dismissed as too expensive a similarly equipped version of the same car listing for $2,300. Also, Chevrolet did sell a fair number of base-trim Corvairs (around 63,000 for 1960), and I’m sure there were sales execs who argued that standardizing a better-equipped trim level would have meant throwing those sales away. The corporate priority was maximizing return on tooling investment, which generally meant maximizing production volume. Selling 300,000+ cars a year paid off the tooling costs far more quickly than building “only” 200,000 of a pricier better-trimmed version. The problem, of course, was knowing where to draw the line so that the price-leader base model didn’t become seriously deficient. For instance, I think it was probably reasonable to sacrifice the original plan to make Powerglide standard, but both the Corvair and Tempest should have had the ’64 Corvair suspension from the outset, even on base models.

      (One point the Tempest story highlights is that just the front anti-roll bar was not enough. The Tempest got that much sooner than the Corvair did — as a running change for 1961 — and it didn’t help all that much. I suspect also adding a transverse leaf spring would have helped, although perhaps not quite as much as on the Corvair. Part of the issue with the Corvair was that its rear springs had to be stiffer to support the powertrain, which was less of an issue with the rope-drive Tempest, although the transverse spring might still have helped to reign in the camber change antics.)

  3. Another quality article,Aaron.The Tempest was definitely a fascinating design, second only to the Corvair in ingenuity in that era.By the way, International Harvester also used a Half-a-V8 design in the Scout, a contemporary of the original Tempest. It had a much longer production run.

    1. The International Harvester 4 had a displacement of 152 cubic inches, in the same ballpark as GM’s Iron Duke. Presumably it wouldn’t have been very refined, but it would have been more refined than the Trophy 4. In that application a high degree of refinement probably wasn’t expected.

      1. I’m not very familiar with IHC engines, but the brochures I could find say the seventies “Comanche 196” engine displaced 195.4 cu. in. (3,203 cc), which was a bit bigger than the Trophy 4 and probably about as rough.

        1. I wasn’t aware of that one. I’m pretty sure they had a 152 CID I4 also.

          1. Yes, there was a smaller “Comanche Four” that was first introduced for 1961. It was based on the V-304 and shared its bore and stroke, giving 151.8 cubic inches (2,488). The “Comanche 196” followed in 1968, based on the V-392.

          2. I found I had a Car Life review of the 1961 Scout with the 152, whose refinement they characterize only as “smoother than you might expect” — not very revealing in this case, and not an especially high bar. They note the conceptual similarity to the Pontiac Trophy 4, but unfortunately offer no detailed comparison, which might have been interesting.

    2. That 4-cylinder Scout engine could also be had with a turbocharger, although I think it was more aimed at high-altitude areas like the Rocky Mountain states than just extra power.

      1. I read a little bit about that the other day. Apparently, the turbo package, which made 111 hp (compared to 93 hp for the normally aspirated four) was expensive and not terribly well-sorted, and was fairly rare. It expired not long after the bigger 196 cu. in. four became available, although it was still listed as an option into 1968. (The 1968 Scout brochure lists normally aspirated and turbo 152 and normally aspirated 196.)

  4. I have a 1962 version of the Tempest service manual that I picked up at the swap meet in Carlisle (PA) many years ago. I hoped to own one some day after reading “Unsafe At Any Speed” and seeing the quote from Road Test magazine printed in late 1964 to describe the new for 1965 Corvair with the proper independent rear end. It said (speaking of the 2nd gen Corvair), “Previous to 1965. the car was probably the worst riding, worst all-around handling car available to the American public with the exception of the original Pontiac Tempest.” So one can infer that the Tempest was – at the time – THE worst riding, THE worst handling car available – at any price – in North America, at least according to the authors of that article. Reading that made me really want a Tempest – to celebrate it as the worst of the worst in every automobile attribute you can define and quantify. How awesome.

    To describe this car as a magnificent kludge is accurate when you read the proper procedure for setting rear wheel toe alignment. On the 1961-1962 models, the service manual says you adjust the toe angle by using shims on the rear swing arm mounting points to slightly change their angle (as viewed from above) from the roughly 40 degrees to a little more or less. Each wheel can be adjusted independently. With the hubs bolted to those arms, changing their angle changes the rear wheel toe – in or out. But doing so also moves the transaxle slightly in a longitudinal direction. And remember that the engine is rigidly fixed to the transaxle via the torque tube. So in comes the kludge part of the procedure: Before adding or removing shims to adjust rear toe, the manual says you should loosen the motor mounts, add/remove shims to get the toe set properly, then run the engine for a few minutes to allow the engine to settle into proper position after being moved forward or rearward within the car, then shut down and tighten the engine mounts. That sounds like a “gee we never thought of that” workaround, doesn’t it?

    Thank you for covering this unique moment in automotive history. It reminds me so much of those cooking shows that give three or four teams and handful of ingredients and challenge them to make a gourmet meal from what they are given. In the case of the Tempest, they got the Olds/Buick body, a Buick V8, half of a Pontiac V8, and a Corvair rear suspension and transaxle. And from that, they prepared the best they could within the budget and time limitations.

    1. Since you’re moving the engine forward or backward, how much force do you have to bring to bear on the shims?

      1. The torque specs in shop manual were nothing particularly extreme. It seems that the specific issue was that the engine mounts were VERY soft and allowed a lot of deflection, making it easy to inadvertently misalign the whole powertrain.

        The revised 1963 suspension simplified rear toe adjustments (toe was adjusted by shimming the mounting bracket on the leading end of the control arm, rather than the differential mounts), but the 1963 shop manual still recommended loosening the engine mount bolts first and then retightening them afterward, I assume for the same reason.

        Incidentally, the 1961 and 1962 shop manuals recommended inspecting rear toe and adjusting as needed every 2,000 miles, so this was not an infrequent chore if you followed the manual!

  5. Thanks for another great article, Aaron! I enjoy reading about unusual designs and what led to those decisions.

    Is there any info on how the rope drive fared in service? I’ve wondered how the continued flex and torque would affect the metal over time or if the support bearings life was affected.

    1. The Pontiac engineers who developed the Tempest said the early cars suffered problems with the engine timing gear basically shaking itself to bits, since the V-8 timing gear and timing chain wasn’t designed for the greater shaking forces of the four-cylinder engine, and a contemporary owners’ survey found a surprising number of owners (around 30 percent) complaining of problems with the manual clutch. Those seem to have been the major initial reliability issues.

      It seems that at least within the cars’ original design lifetime, the flexible driveshaft itself worked out pretty well. I don’t know what the fatigue life of the shaft ended up being in practice; I couldn’t find any detailed information on that, so I can only speculate based on the design parameters. Pontiac did try to over-engineer the driveshaft to avoid fatigue problems (heat-treated shot-peened forged steel, which was very expensive), and the bending moment is supposed to remain constant throughout the shaft, so I don’t know that the curvature would affect the shaft’s fatigue life that much. However, I do have to wonder about the torsional forces involved. The shaft was designed to twist through a range of about 60 degrees (30 degree in each direction), which seems like it would eventually take a toll, both on the shaft and on the protective coating applied to its surface.

      As for the torque tube bearings, their main function appears to have been to support the shaft in the tube, and the shop manual asserts that they were sealed for life, so it appears Pontiac assumed their operating stresses would be fairly low. The shop manual doesn’t list any procedure for inspecting or replacing them in service, although I have to wonder what happened when they got old and the rubber and plastic insulators within each bearing assembly started to get crunchy. A more immediate concern may have been the longevity of the torque tube itself, particularly in areas that used a lot of road salt. I assume the driveshaft’s protective coating was intended to prevent corrosion, but the torque tube was just stamped steel, and so moisture inside the tube or bad surface rust, especially around the bearing mounts, seems like a potentially nasty problem on an older car.

      Again, I don’t have any hard data or first-hand experience to share in these regards, and I’m definitely NOT a mechanic, but those are the areas of the design that seem like obvious areas of concern.

  6. So good to see this superb article finished and posted. Extremely thorough and lots details and context.

    A couple of minor things or questions: That ’61 LeMans coupe without any exterior bright trim threw me. It went against everything I knew and remembered about the LeMans, a package of trim and other features comparable to the Monza. I can’t imagine a “stripped” one being offered. I went to the 1961 Tempest brochure, and in the text for the LeMans, it says “Full custom treatment on hardware and trim – all standard!” I very strongly suspect that the pictured LeMans in your post was either de-trimmed for some reason, custom-ordered, or maybe it was base Tempest that someone add the LeMans badges to? Whatever; it’s a pretty minor detail.

    Like you, I thought the ’63 restyle was not successful, in its attempt to make these cars look bigger, undoubtedly to transition them to the larger A body for ’64. And yes, the ’62 front end is not very good either.

    You summed it up perfectly in your title; this was a classic kludge. I understand what DeLorean was trying to do, and appreciate the limitations they had, but the result is both fascinating yet unsatisfying on a number of levels.

    Our next door neighbor in Iowa City bought a new ’62 LeMans convertible; she was a single, Russian middle-aged professor of Russian at the university. One could say she was perhaps a representative target demographic? The sound of that big four was deeply imprinted on me at that age, not in a very good way, but I did have a memorable ride in it once, with the top down. That rather masked the sound of the engine!

    1. If you mean the blue Le Mans with the white roof (which is a ’62), I don’t know its provenance, so I can only speculate. This is also complicated by the fact that the 1961–1963 brochures I could find did not have any detailed specifications for the Le Mans, which leaves some question about how much of the chrome trim was standard. The Custom included some but not all of the optional brightwork, and my guess would be that at least some of the chrome gewgaws (e.g., the fuel door filler trim) was probably still optional with the Le Mans package. It’s also possible that the owner didn’t like some of the chrome bits, or, perhaps more plausibly, had lost or damaged the trim on one side, couldn’t find a full set of replacement trim, and decided to remove the rest so it would at least be symmetrical. It would not be a base coupe with Le Mans badges (since I believe the base coupes came only with the now very rare standard coupe roofline rather than as “Sport Coupes”), although it might be a Custom coupe with Le Mans badges. Short of asking the owner, I don’t know.

      The ’63 restyling/enlargement was apparently proposed by Pontiac quite early, I believe before the decision about what to do for ’64 had been made. So, I think it wasn’t so much a transition to the bigger ’64s as a response to B-O-P managers fretting that the ’61 senior compacts looked too dinky, even with 4 inches more wheelbase than a Corvair. That said, it did end up serving as a transition to the ’64 Tempest/Le Mans, which I think had better proportions.

  7. A Happy New Year, and thanks for another great article.

  8. It’s quite fascinating that the “compact” car of the past in North America are considered big cars elsewhere, including places that are said to have similar taste to America, like Australia (Even the largest Falcons of the 70s are smaller than the Mavericks at that time). Pretty sure the Tempest is similar.

    1. Yes, that’s been a recurring theme. The 1961–62 Tempest was 189.3 inches (4,808 mm) on a 112-inch wheelbase and 72.2 inches (1,834 mm) wide, weighing around 3,000 lb (1,360 kg) with the four-cylinder engine and automatic, so it was not a particularly small car on a global scale. For instance, it was 21 inches longer and 9.7 inches wider than a Mk1 Ford Cortina, and about half a ton heavier. (The Tempest was the heaviest of the Buick-Oldsmobile-Pontiac Y-body “senior compacts” with the four-cylinder engine; the Buick aluminum V-8 and cast iron V-6 were a good deal lighter.)

  9. Aaron, thank you for this interesting article on the rope=drive Pontiacs. I owned GTOs and Le Manses in my younger days (Along with a Catalina) and counted myself as a Pontiac afficianado, and I also very much liked the BOP Y bodies (especially the turbocharched Cutlass), but never owned one.

    Most of us who enjoy cars are familiar with the Corvair swing axle issues, and in this article you have added good teaching about what was and was not inherited by Y body Tempests which used the Corvair derived transaxle. I especially appreciated your description of automatic transmission differences from the Corvair version, and also your discussions regarding the “rope” itself.

    But (there’s always at least one, isn’t there?) while I recognize that the subject and purpose of your article was to discuss Y body Pontiacs, I’ve always had questions regarding these cars and Corvairs. I understand the issue about roll centers, camber changes, and sudden oversteer. What I do not understand is why the same design was used by Volkswagen (also a “cheap” car), Porsche (not a cheap car and noted for its handling), and Mercedes Benz cars from the 50s to the 70s, and similar Jill Claybrook-inspired handwaving and pearl-clutching hasn’t accompanied those autos?

    (By the way, I believe Ford used a similar sort of idea in their “Twin I Beam” 4 wheel drive front axles in their pickups, where the lengthened arms were intended to counter camber changes, with middling results.)

    I think I understand that Mecedes Benz used a lower center pivot point for their swing axle and incorporated some sort of monkey motion to make the swing axle behave in an intermediate way between a fully independent system and a live axle with regard to camber change.

    I wonder if your story of Rudi Uhlenhaut testing and commenting on the Tempest had something to do with the Mercedes Benz implementation of the swing axle?

    I also think that Porsche used an anti-roll bar on the rear swing axles of some of their models, but I’m not so sure about this.

    Did the DeLorean patents have something to do with designing some Mercedes Benz-like trickery to the Tempest suspension?

    If it is convenient for you to shed a little light on this question (Corvair and Y body Tempest versus Mercedes Benz, Volkswagen, and Porsche swing axles), I would very much appreciate your comments.

    Another thing you’ve done with this article is add more fuel to my mental exercises regarding John Z DeLorean. I’ve always liked the Pontiac OHC 6 (aand still do!) and your discussion of his Packard Ultramatic are very interesting. Now you’ve added the rope drive and the slicing of the Pontiac V8, a la Sesco midget engine, to the whole John Z DeLorean story, along with his rebellious GM leadership years, the DMC episode, and also his cocaine sales sideline. He was clearly a complex man with talent, taste, and a tug-of-war between ambition and ethics. I don’t say this from a judgmental perspecive, but rather a contemplation of the human nature we all share.

    Thanks again!

    1. What I do not understand is why the same design was used by Volkswagen (also a “cheap” car), Porsche (not a cheap car and noted for its handling), and Mercedes Benz cars from the 50s to the 70s, and similar Jill Claybrook-inspired handwaving and pearl-clutching hasn’t accompanied those autos?

      Volkswagen DID; the Beetle got its share of negative ink in Unsafe at Any Speed for that reason. Mercedes-Benz, meanwhile, mitigated the worst of it with the low-pivot axle. The original gull-wing 300SL, which didn’t have it, is still notorious for its unforgiving swing-axle characteristics, although there were so few of the coupes and seeing one was and is such a rare event that it’s just kind of part of the lore. The low-pivot axle used on the 190SL, the W113 cars, and most of the sedans and coupes, lowers the roll center, reduces the tendency to jacking (which is an angularity issue), and limits rear roll stiffness. It’s still not ideal geometrically, but it’s less likely to be treacherous.

      As for Porsche, the rear-engined air-cooled cars’ penchant for tail-swinging was well-known, evidenced by years of reviews insisting that the latest suspension revisions had definitely finally, truly put to rest the nasty oversteering antics, while assuring the ego-sensitive reader that those antics were never really a problem for someone who Knows What They’re Doing, that eternal shibboleth of automotive apologism. I will grant that with a 356, (a) their reputation for oversteer certainly preceded them, and (b) they were sports cars, with quick steering and sharper reflexes, so you could potentially manage the tail’s periodic excursions from linearity without necessarily going around in circles or wrapping the car around a pole. (The air-cooled 911 had semi-trailing arms in back and wasn’t quite the same animal, although semi-trailing arms have sharpish trailing-throttle characteristics even with a forward weight bias.)

      The dilemma with the Tempest, as with the Corvair, is that its chassis was trying hard to be conventional American family car: soft springs, soft shocks, slow steering, and rear suspension geometry compromised by the expectation that people would really want to use it to carry six passengers. So, there was little immediate indication that it would handle differently than other cars of its size and vintage (most of which did not, it should be said, handle very well either). If you tripped over the line, it was hard to catch and the suspension and steering were not very cooperative.

      This is the point of the Uhlenhaut anecdote. He was obviously showing off — it was part of a Mercedes launch demonstration — and I assume he intended to put the tail out, presumably to contrast its behavior with the better-mannered low-pivot Mercedes rear axle. However, even with advanced planning and a high level of skill, he overcooked it, memorably alarming people who witnessed it.

      The Mercedes low-pivot axle would not have translated directly to the Tempest for a number of reasons, particularly the rigid interconnection between the transaxle and the engine. DeLorean came up with two alternatives: The first carried each rear wheel on a big, wide lower A-arm, hinged at the bottom of the differential; each swing axle only had a single inboard U-joint, but had a telescoping section allowing it to change length as the wheel moved from jounce to rebound, providing a longer swing arm length and lower roll center. The second, which he actually called a “simulated low pivot swing axle suspension,” also specified telescoping U-joints, but had no lower control arm, just a transverse leaf spring bolted to the underside of the differential, serving as both control arm and spring. How well these would have worked in practice is hard to say — I’m not sure if they were ever even built — but they were designed to achieve similar effects as the Mercedes low-pivot axle, albeit not in the same ways.

      The Tempest would probably have benefited from some of the fixes Chevrolet eventually offered for the Corvair. There was initially a H-D kit for the Corvair that included stiffer but lower coil springs that effectively decambered the rear suspension, along with a front anti-roll bar (which the Tempest had by the end of 1961) and limiter straps for the rear swing axles, as a crude way of limiting tuck-under. The ’64 Corvair had softer rear coils with a transverse leaf spring between the rear trailing arms, pivoted off the bottom of the differential, so it would support the rear end vertically and resist tuck-under without adding to rear roll stiffness. It wasn’t as elaborate as the completely new three-link suspension for ’65, but it helped. Unfortunately, Pontiac didn’t offer anything like that, so it would have been a matter of trying to find aftermarket or homemade solutions.

      As far as I know, early swing axle suspensions didn’t use rear anti-roll bars, since the high roll center and stiff rear springs provided more than enough rear roll stiffness. Some later Porsche rear-engine models did, but as mentioned, the 911 had semi-trailing arms, not swing axles.

      1. Thank you, Aaron! This makes a lot more sense than what I possessed on the subject.

        Would it be correct to say that the Corvair’s, Volkwagen’s, and Porsche’s oversteer habits were exacerbated beyond swing axle issues with the engine hanging from behind the rear axle? It would seem that having that weight out at the end of the car would want to bring the rear around when the car got out of shape.

        Regarding Mercedes Benz and Uhlenhaut, I am not dismissive of their technology, as they certainly have a long and enviable record of innovation, development, and quality. However, I try to always apply a degree of skepticism regarding matters that seem to fall under commonly accepted truth/myth. When I was young, I recall going to the Chicago Auto Show with a friend (this would have been in the early to mid 70s, when Pontiac Firebirds had big chickens on their hoods). Stopping at the Mercedes Benz display and having been inculcated with machines like the 300SLR with desmodromic valves and the W196, I saw a display of their high tech carburetor, which was such an obvious rip off of GM’s Quadrajet (a carburetor that I did and still do hold in low esteem) shocked me with its near total resemblance. The Rochester carburetor book by Bill Fisher and Doug Roe even has a cutaway diagram of the Solex carburetor Mercedes Benz used in those years and notes this resemblance on page 122. I recall the representative giving me a very condescending look, which did nothing in my mind to dissuade me from the opinion that he was a snob, and snobby as only an ignorant person can be.

        Returning to the Pontiac, it seems that this is yet one more of many issues from Detroit where the “what ifs” can be tracked back to money. As much as I hate to admit it, when it came to compacts, McNamara had the right idea with the Falcon and, as you rightly pointed out, Ford’s artistry with cast iron. The technology in that case really did have a direct and positive effect on what the customer bought, even if it wasn’t understood or even known.

        Your noting the popularity of the Le Mans and Monza packages shows that the public wasn’t completely turned off by the smaller car if it was marketed correctly. Cosworth Vegas and Fieros had promise, as did even the Pontiac OHC 6, but all of these cars didn’t have what Toyotas et al had. This is a pretty recurrent story, I suppose: as you allude to, even Rover and TVR could take the Buick 215 and make it into something good (not to mention Repco!) that Detroit always seemed to miss.

        1. My object in mentioning Uhlenhaut specifically was not to say, “Mercedes-Benz good, Pontiac bad,” but rather, “Even in the hands of an expert driver, the Tempest’s handling characteristics could be a handful.” (I don’t think any reasonable person would disagree that Rudi Uhlenhaut Knew What He Was Doing behind the wheel of an automobile.)

          I’m sympathetic to people who bristle at the accusation that a relatively cheap American car is technologically inferior to a European car costing vastly more money (a Mercedes 220SE cost very nearly $3,000 more than a 1961 Tempest, and a Lancia Flaminia sedan was getting on to three times the Tempest’s base price). On the other hand, even Chevrolet made more of an effort to address the handling flaws of the swing-axle Corvair, and there was no particular reason Pontiac couldn’t have done the same. (The 1962–63 Corvair handling kit wasn’t standard because the decambering of the shorter springs wasn’t desirable for carrying a full load of passengers; the 1964 compensating spring didn’t have that issue, although decambering would have further improved handling.)

          As for the question of whether the location of the engine made a difference, the answer is, “Yes and no.” Putting the mass of the engine behind the rear axle is obviously going to shift the longitudinal center of gravity rearward, and means that once the tail cuts loose, it will have more inertia. Furthermore, the rear springs will tend to be stiffer because they have to support the weight of the engine, although this can be mitigated by using a compensating spring that is arranged so it doesn’t contribute to roll stiffness. On the other hand, a lot of the problems with swing axles come down to unfavorable geometry, exacerbated on the Tempest and early Corvair by static positive camber.

          Jerry Titus, who had written a cogent dissection of the Corvair’s handling problems in the last issue of a short-lived magazine called Foreign Cars Illustrated (reprinted in the Brooklands Corvair road test portfolio), wrote a followup in Sports Car Graphic, where he reported that the Corvair’s cornering power actually improved by about 20% by adding 170 lb of weights on the floor of the back seat. The reason was that this more closely replicated the original design parameters for the suspension: The expectation was that the Corvair and Tempest would be used as family sedans, and with such a short swing arm length, that meant the static camber had to be positive so that adding weight in the rear wouldn’t produce excessive negative camber and high tire wear. Adding weight eliminated the positive camber, letting the rear wheels get a better bite on the pavement, and changed the angles of the halfshafts relative to the U-joints so that jacking was less likely. This is an area where the Porsche 356 was starting with an advantage; Porsche had not set up the suspension with the expectation that it would carry six passengers!

          The dilemma that all the domestic automakers ended up facing in the early sixties was that the market for which they had designed the compacts was not really the one they ended up with. The initial Ford Falcon was pretty much what dealers had been screaming for in 1957: It was cheap, it was thrifty, it was uncomplicated, and it didn’t scare the horses. The idea that people would want to pay extra (and, on a percentage basis, a bunch extra) for junior Thunderbirds was not really on the table at the outset, and it seems Detroit was pretty well flummoxed by it. People did still buy the cheaper base cars, and at a rate that I think would have made the divisions very reluctant to push the base prices too high, but the take-up for the deluxe editions was really unexpectedly good. I don’t think it was a matter of “marketing them right” so much as the buying public having turned out to want something different that happened to be more plush. (By contrast, I don’t know that the Monza, Futura, et al would have gone over terribly well if the cars had been launched that way just a couple of years earlier — look at what happened when Chrysler brought out the K-car in the early eighties, where the early cars were optioned up at a time where people wanted basic and cheap.)

          The aluminum V-8 is another matter. Producing the engine early on really proved to be kind of a nightmare. Buick used semi-permanent molds (metal exterior molds with sand cores for the internal passages), which turned out to be much more expensive than anticipated, took too long, and had various areas where things could and did go wrong, resulting in excessive porosity and/or machining chips that weren’t completely cleaned out of the castings. Rover didn’t have anyone who could replicate the semi-permanent mold process, so they redesigned the block so that it could be sand cast, with pressed-in cylinder liners rather than the cast-in liners of the original. They also benefited from a great deal of technical assistance from Buick, which was happy to share their experience with production and service issues, and from Joe Turlay, the Buick motor engineer who had designed the engine (from original Engineering Staff concepts).

          Keep in mind also that from Buick’s perspective, they hadn’t abandoned the small V-8 so much as developed it into a series of far less troublesome, much cheaper, and still quite light cast iron engines. The 90-degree V-6 in 225 cubic inch form was still under 400 lb (with all accessories, minus flywheel) and just as powerful as the aluminum 215, if not as smooth. The iron 300/340 V-8 didn’t have any smoothness worries and only weighed about as much as a Ford 289, also one of the lightest V-8s in the industry. So, Buick felt they’d made a couple of silk purses out of a sow’s ear, and, according to Rover and BL engineers, were somewhat incredulous and at least a little amused that BL was still interested in the old aluminum version.

          As I’ve said elsewhere, I’m not convinced the Y-body Tempest had any abundance of untapped potential. Giving it a camber compensating spring à la ’64 Corvair would have made it more agreeable without any dire compromises, and a decambered “performance suspension” and faster-ratio steering for a few extra bucks might have made it a bit more agile, but the A-body Tempest/Le Mans/GTO was where the market was going, and the rope-drive powertrain was not readily compatible with that.

  10. Aaron, you bring up a number of interesting topics, which I find useful and educational!

    1. The Buick (BOP) Aluminum 215: All I had understood about these engines was that there were many service issues connected with people not using antifreeze in the aluminum block and the resulting corrosion causing a great deal of trouble. I did not know that a sort of die casting technique for casting these engines was used, or that the British went to a full sand casting process to make them. Nor did I know that Buick engineers lent some engineering assistance to them for adapting this motor to British use.

    The engineering needed for making aluminum things was not foreign to the British or to the USA: plenty of aircraft engines were made by both nations during the War, and some small amount of expertise would have resided with outboard motor manufacturers at the time.

    As I recall, Chrysler tried to make a Slant 6 out of aluminum at this same time, which was also abandoned. I’ve read that modern hot rodders have sought out these aluminum Slant 6s and have experienced issues with warping, and I wonder if this is why Chrysler gave them up, as well.

    2. Yes, Buick did develop two forks from the 215: the V6, which they ended up having to get back from Jeep. The V6, with some development, did go on to enjoy some respectable power output in stock form in the Buick Grand Nationals. The other fork, as you said, went into making the engine out of thin iron and increasing its size to 300, 340, and 350 cu in. I believe the first or all of the 300s retained aluminum cylinder heads.

    The bore spacing of the original engines didn’t allow a 4″ bore, so by the time these V8s got to 350 inches, they had long strokes. None of these engines had great heads, and they had cast rods, so in my youth I scorned them. I preferred the Olds low deck V8 (330, 350, and much later 403) which didn’t have great heads either, but they did have forged rods. (You’ll undoubtedly note my hypocrisy here, being a Pontiac man in my youth!)

    Cadillac, too, went to cast iron wonders (block, heads, crank, rods) and today we even have sintered rods with break cap joints on the big ends from the factory (like a McCulloch chainsaw, of all things!) and all of this stuff works OK. Maybe the commentary that can be made here is that Detroit often did not stick with their engineering and development, not only with making aluminum engines, but with high silicon bore finishes (Vega), converting gasoline to diesel engines (the Olds 350 – it was doable as GM had done with the GMC V6, but they didn’t do their developmental homework), the Cadillac wet sleeve 4.1 and 4.5 V8, and a host of other technologies.

    I’ve understood that Ford was traditionally the most conservative maker. They stuck with cast iron. Old timers have told me that, in the Model T days, Ford bolts were legendary for their hardness — a result of Henry’s vanadium, I assume. Henry’s foundry technique was good, even making serviceable crankshafts for the V8 when everyone else used a more expensive forging process. It’s no surprise that Ford would lead the way in thinwall casting back at the beginning of the 60s, first with the 144 six, and then with the 221 V8. This was much cheaper than aluminum and apparently avoiding terra incognita engineering-wise was a profitable decision. Buick, as you said, followed and Olds wasn’t far behind with the thin cast 330 in ’64 and the 425 in 65. I don’t claim that those first Falcons were wonder cars (I’m certainly no admirer of McNamara, either as a proponent of daylight precision bombing winning the war, as a bean counter, or other things), but he did provide a serviceable product at a reasonable price in the Falcon. Iacocca dressed this car up in the ultimate dress-up job, the Mustang, and Ford found this to be very profitable indeed.

    2. I do bristle at the idea of Europeans knocking American engineering, but also at the not-invented-here attitude of many Americans (of which I was formerly one). Back in the 60s and early 70s, my impression was that some European cars were of high quality, but also that some American cars were pretty well designed and assembled, too. The price difference you mention did provide a value, but some 60s-era American iron offered quite a bit of “bang for the buck,” as well. But perhaps the issue is moot. Detroit is hardly in the car business anymore. Apparently, the only place USA makers can find refuge from the world is from behind LBJ’s “Chicken Law” of 1965. Beyond the pale of that, profitability seems elusive for them.

    Thanks for the suspension discussion. Porsche did seem to make the rear engine layout work pretty well.

    You mention the Y body Tempest’s potential, and I think that you are right. Americans wanted cheap cars during the Eisenhower recession but soon forgot that in a few years, and Detroit followed suit. (The A bodies and the Mustang are great examples of this.) It’s a shame that the concepts of rear engine, front engine/rear transmission, and a host of other innovations weren’t appreciated by the public. I think, for instance, of the switch pitch feature in TH400s and front wheel drive were discontinued as a cost saving measure, since the public didn’t appreciate its value. So many of these technologies were rediscovered and reapplied in our modern era. If we cannot blame Detroit for following the market rather than a “better” technology direction, should they be let off the hook for losing a great deal of their market share by sticking with their bean-counter mentality in the 70s and the 80s?

    1. As I recall, Chrysler tried to make a Slant 6 out of aluminum at this same time, which was also abandoned. I’ve read that modern hot rodders have sought out these aluminum Slant 6s and have experienced issues with warping, and I wonder if this is why Chrysler gave them up, as well.

      Yes, both Chrysler and AMC offered sixes with aluminum blocks. AMC offered one for the 196 from 1961 to 1964, Chrysler on 1961–1963 225s. Unlike the Buick engine, both AMC and Chrysler had die-cast blocks with iron heads. Neither worked out well. The blocks had open decks, and the loads on the cylinder walls and on the head gaskets were quite high. Because iron and aluminum have different expansion rates, overheating can be very troublesome with an iron/aluminum engine (either aluminum heads on an iron block or iron heads on an aluminum block), potentially leading to permanent damage. There may also have been coolant compatibility issues.

      I think the bigger problem was that the blocks were a lot more expensive than iron and provided no particular benefit other than reduced weight (on the order of 70 lb), so the cost-benefit ratio wasn’t great and the blocks tended to be more fragile than the iron equivalents.

      All I had understood about these engines was that there were many service issues connected with people not using antifreeze in the aluminum block and the resulting corrosion causing a great deal of trouble.

      There were several major issues. First, the early aluminum castings ended up having issues with excessive porosity, despite Buick giving them up to three rounds of sealant. Second, there were, as I mentioned, problems with cleaning the castings completely to remove small chips of metal. (One downside with semi-permanent mold castings is that holes generally have to be drilled rather than cast, which I assume didn’t help.) Third, certain types of antifreeze would strip off the top layers of the aluminum. I would surmise that it was probably worse with castings that came through too porous, since that would presumably accelerate the process. The water in the coolant would then cause the little bits of aluminum to corrode, which was accelerated by the copper in the radiator core. Result: a horrible mess. Worse, Buick and Olds didn’t initially know which antifreeze brands would cause the scrubbing effect, so they had to do a lot of trial and error to figure out what to recommend to owners and dealers. These problems weren’t unsolvable — obviously, aluminum engines are now very common — but the learning curve was steep, painful, and expensive.

      I did not know that a sort of die casting technique for casting these engines was used, or that the British went to a full sand casting process to make them.

      Semi-permanent mold casting is not die casting. With die casting, you have metal molds into which molten metal is forced at very high pressure (8,000 to 10,000 psi). This is very expensive to set up because the die assembly has to be enormous. (The one Chrysler used for its aluminum Slant Six blocks weighed 22 tons!) Semi-permanent molds use a combination of reusable metal molds and non-reusable sand cores; the metal molds are closed hydraulically for casting, but it doesn’t require the same extremes of pressure. In theory, die casting is more precise and has fewer problems with cleaning, but it’s also more expensive and has its own learning curves.

      With the Rover 3.5, the conversion for sand casting made the engine somewhat heavier — not a lot, I think something on the order of 25 or 30 lb — but it was expedient, cheaper, and ended up being less troublesome. Rover also had both extensive engineering notes and Joe Turlay himself to share what had gone wrong with the early engines and how to fix or avoid those issues. For instance, I don’t think Rover had to reinvent the wheel with regard to coolant, whereas Buick and Oldsmobile had had to run whole banks of test engines while arguing with different antifreeze vendors to figure out which formulations would cause scrubbing.

      I believe the first or all of the 300s retained aluminum cylinder heads.

      Only in 1964. The 1965 300 had iron heads.

      The bore spacing of the original engines didn’t allow a 4″ bore, so by the time these V8s got to 350 inches, they had long strokes. None of these engines had great heads, and they had cast rods, so in my youth I scorned them.

      The 215 was designed for the Y-body cars, so compactness and light weight were major priorities. (It was originally supposed to be only 180 cubic inches (3.0 liters rather than 3.5), with the idea that they could offer a bigger-displacement version later as a step-up option, but there were concerns about torque.) The bore spacing was one result of that. As for the head design, it ended up being one of the reasons the V-6 had such a long life: The slanted saucer combustion chamber (which was largely Turlay’s work, since the Engineering Staff design had the entire chamber in the top of the piston) turned out to be effective in reducing hydrocarbon emissions. Oldsmobile was initially dubious about that design, so the Olds 215 heads have wedge combustion chambers. In any case, the object was to provide good torque with regular fuel and much cooler timing than Buick had ended up using for the bigger Nailhead. It was supposed to be an economy engine, although that didn’t work out because the production costs ended up being much higher than anticipated, even discounting the warranty nightmares. Even the 300 wasn’t intended as a hot rod engine; it was a step-up engine for the A-body and a cheaper base engine for the B-body.

      It’s no surprise that Ford would lead the way in thinwall casting back at the beginning of the 60s, first with the 144 six, and then with the 221 V8. This was much cheaper than aluminum and apparently avoiding terra incognita engineering-wise was a profitable decision.

      Ford’s foundry work in the days of Henry I were a mixed bag — the flathead V-8 had some strengths and a lot of weaknesses, some not fixed until the fifties. Thinwall casting as used on the Falcon six and Fairlane V-8 was a largely new development, which emerged in the fifties as an offshoot of some work they had done on crankshaft casting. (The basic idea is to add thermosetting resin to the sand cores, so they’re more rigid, and then casting and curing the cores in a preheated box without removing them for heat-treating, so there are fewer opportunities for distortion.) Many other manufacturers subsequently adopted similar techniques for iron engines, but to varying degrees of effect, and they didn’t necessarily save nearly as much weight; perhaps the most notorious example was the late BMC C-series six used in the 3-litre and MGC.

      I strongly suspect the reason Ford went as far as they did with those engines was MacNamara. MacNamara insisted on very stringent weight limits for the Falcon — the 1960 Falcon was roughly the size of a Mk3 Mondeo, with a cast iron six, but it had a curb weight of around 2,400 lb — and I think the 144 engine ended up as light as it did (345 lb) because they weren’t going to be able to hit those targets otherwise, forcing the manufacturing people to push the thinwall idea further than they might otherwise. (It was arguably too far; as the Australians found out, the initial Falcon was kind of flimsy for anything but gentle suburban commuting, and later versions of the six were stouter, especially after the switch to seven main bearings.) The 221/260/289/302 was an immediate beneficiary of those efforts.

      (I think the lightness of the Buick iron V-6 and V-8 was more a result of starting with a design intended for aluminum, which tends to have to be thicker for comparable strength.)

      Olds wasn’t far behind with the thin cast 330 in ’64 and the 425 in 65.

      The 330 is another example of what I mean by not all manufacturers using thinwall casting techniques to the same extent. Olds used thinwall casting for three of the block’s six cores (water jackets and crankcase core), not the whole block, and I don’t think for the heads; they made some design changes like reducing the width of the heads (and adopting more Buick-like combustion chambers) to save some weight, but the use of hot box resin cores was pretty conservative. Hence, the 330 weighed about 40 lb more than a Chevrolet 350 and about 100 lb more than the Ford 289/302. The 425 was not a thinwall engine, despite its similarity to the 330. This was a foundry issue rather than a design one; the design essentially had provision for hot box coring, but didn’t use it, so the 425 was only a little lighter than the 394. (The 455 was, or became, a thinwall engine, but the initial 425 was not.)

      1. I understand that the Nailhead had aggressive valve timing in compensation for the small valves.

        1. To some extent, particularly as displacement increased. For the original 1953 322, intake duration was 282 degrees, with 0.378-inch intake lift and 67 degrees of overlap, which was warmer than the fifties norm. For comparison, the 1955 Packard V-8 had an intake duration of 250 degrees, with 0.375 inches of lift and 32 degrees of overlap; the Packard engine had substantially bigger valves, so it didn’t need as much lift or duration.

          However, by the time Buick expanded the Nailhead to 425 cubic inches, intake duration was up to 290 degrees, with 0.439-inch intake lift and 77 degrees of overlap. For comparison, the cam in a 1964 Pontiac 421 H.O. provided 288 degrees’ intake duration, 0.409-inch intake lift, and 63 degrees of overlap, and the non-H.O. 421 and 389 were significantly cooler than that.

          Buick actually didn’t back off that much on the timing with the initial 400 and 430 despite their larger valves. Their initial cam profile was 298 degrees of intake duration, 0.421-inch lift, and 61 degrees of overlap.

      2. A point I discovered after making this comment in January is that there’s some variation in nomenclature when it comes to casting methods: Apparently in British (and probably Canadian and Australian) usage, semi-permanent mold casting IS often called die casting, with what American usage calls die casting referred to as “pressure die casting” or “high-pressure die casting.” This had been throwing me; I didn’t realize the terminological confusion until I saw a comment mentioning this point in the discussion section of a technical paper. (That the commenter took the time to spell it out suggests that I’m not the only one who was confused.)

        There is still a significant distinction between semi-permanent molds/low-pressure die casting and high-pressure die casting; aside from the much greater pressures involved, pressure die casting imposes certain limits on the shape and design of the cast object (since there has to be a way to remove the die from the casting!).

    2. You mention the Y body Tempest’s potential, and I think that you are right. Americans wanted cheap cars during the Eisenhower recession but soon forgot that in a few years, and Detroit followed suit.

      This is true, but even if it were otherwise, I don’t think the Y-body Tempest had a lot of potential. In this, I mean that the car as it existed was a dead end, short of essentially starting over with an all-new car of similar mechanical configuration: new engine, new suspension, new transaxles, a new body, and probably a largely new marketing direction. There are a number of ways that could theoretically have gone, of varying degrees of plausibility, but when you really come down to it, few if any individual aspects of the 1961–1963 car as it existed were really worth carrying over.

      I think, for instance, of the switch pitch feature in TH400s and front wheel drive were discontinued as a cost saving measure, since the public didn’t appreciate its value.

      Well, front-wheel drive was not discontinued — the Toronado and Eldorado continued with the UPP FWD layout through 1985, joined for the final stretch by the Riviera. It just wasn’t applied on a wider basis, unless you count the GMC Motorhome.

      The rationale for dropping the switch-pitch converter was actually that it created too much noise, which, given that its users were Cadillac, Buick, and Oldsmobile makes a certain amount of sense. It also created an awkward compromise at step-off because the stator was at high angle at idle to reduce creep and then switched to low angle unless you really put your foot in it. When it was dropped for 1968, Olds, Buick, and Cadillac had adopted torquier engines that didn’t need the extra “half-step” of the switch-pitch converter even with taller axle ratios. There’s a discussion of this in the July 1968 Motor Trend, where they actually compared 1967 and 1968 Olds F-85 and Delta 88 cars back to back; with an extra 30 or 40 lb-ft (gross) torque, the ’68s had better performance at all speeds with less commotion.

      After late seventies downsizing, it’s possible the switch-pitch converter would have been helpful, but by then, fuel economy concerns brought the return of lockup converters, and a new philosophy of locking up the converter except at very low speeds and keeping it locked up as much as possible. Remembering the double-clunk of eighties three-speed automatics (shift into or out of third, then lock or unlock the converter), I don’t think they would have been greatly improved by adding an additional “stage” with the torque converter stator trying to decide what to do — certainly not subjectively!

      So, in that sense, I think it was a feature whose useful had, if not exactly ended, reached a point where the end of the road was in sight.

      1. It would be interesting to know why Detroit took so long to come out with 4 spd automatics after the first Oil Crisis. Lowering numerical axle ratios was a quick fix but full of Malaise. Then so quickly this century, they went to 6 to 8 to 10, with increasingly marginal benefits. I suppose the EPA mpg test gives an advantage to more gears (it can’t just be bragging rights), but I hate waiting for downshifts.

        1. So far as Detroit was concerned, the push for four-speed automatics was a combination of things. From a late sixties standpoint, they did not need taller cruising gears, since most passenger car axle ratios were already quite tall, and converter multiplication provided some extra punch off the line. With the power and torque reductions of early emissions controls, having a deeper (higher numerical) low gear became more imperative, and it was harder for engines to cope with the resultant wide spacing with three speeds. Once EPCA passed in 1975, providing the legislative basis for the CAFE rules, there was also even more need to keep cruising ratios tall. However, as that became apparent, there was still significant lead time involved in developing and tooling for new or revised transmissions with an extra set of gears. A lot of early four-speed automatics were essentially three-speeds with an extra overdrive gearset (Ford’s clever but weak-kneed AOD being a notable exception), which meant that space had to be found for adding that, and then once they’d found passably suitable combinations, they had to go through EPA 50,000-mile durability testing, which is time-consuming. If you look at it that way, the timeframe for their introduction is much easier to understand.

  11. No, no, Aaron, you are right:

    Well, front-wheel drive was not discontinued — the Toronado and Eldorado continued with the UPP FWD layout through 1985, joined for the final stretch by the Riviera. It just wasn’t applied on a wider basis, unless you count the GMC Motorhome.

    I have left out the 1980 Citation in 1979, the Mopar K-Cars of 1981, and the later Ford Tempo and Taurus.

    Please forgive my oversight. I intended to show that Detroit had an attention span issue when bringing a new technology to market, and was also too impatient in promoting those new cars. I think I have a point on these issues, but whether I am right about that or not, I am certainly wrong on front wheel drive being a valid example of those premises.

    1. Please forgive my oversight. I intended to show that Detroit had an attention span issue when bringing a new technology to market, and was also too impatient in promoting those new cars.

      Oh, I don’t disagree, and it’s entirely fair to criticize the way GM originally approached FWD. As an exercise, the Unitized Power Package for FWD was not dissimilar to the rope-drive Tempest: It was full of clever ideas, applied in a context where they didn’t make a whole lot of sense, and then not really pursued further (although the Toronado and FWD continued with it, which the Tempest did not).

      Oldsmobile was initially looking at FWD for a compact car (perhaps a second-generation F-85), but for various reasons, ended up introducing it in the Toronado, where most of the advantages of FWD were basically meaningless. (The Toronado was many things, but “space-efficient” was not on the list, and for a personal luxury car to have a flat floor was more a parlor trick than a useful innovation.) Even then, it wouldn’t have been unreasonable to treat the Toronado as a proof of concept and a way to build acceptance before applying the UPP FWD package to other products where it made more sense, such as the Oldsmobile Vista Cruiser wagon, where having a flat floor, no live axle to compete with cargo and passenger space, and above-average wet traction with V-8 power would have been an intriguing proposition. However, they didn’t do that, and the mainstream FWD cars GM later introduced, beginning with the X-body Citation and its siblings, borrowed nothing from the work done on the Toronado and Eldorado. So, the UPP cars, while well-engineered and well-executed, ended up being a costly and arguably pointless vanity project; the Toronado and Eldorado could just as well have been RWD. (Toronado buyers were generally aware of the car’s FWD and considered it a good feature, but I don’t think most Eldorado buyers cared a whit.)

      The big distinction between the Toronado and rope-drive Tempest in this respect is that FWD is better suited to compact family cars (which the Toronado was not) while a front-engine/rear-transaxle layout is better suited to sports cars or high-end GTs (which the Tempest was not). In both cases, though, you had a comparable case of perfectly viable technology being misapplied at a basic product-concept level, and then becoming a dead end. So, that the Tempest would remind you of the Toronado in this way is entirely reasonable!

      1. The possibility this suggests is the idea of applying the rear transaxle to a more expensive car with a more upscale sporty bent than the Y-body compacts. For instance, I could envision something like a 1969 Pontiac Grand Prix with a rear transaxle derived from Turbo Hydra-Matic. I don’t know how such a thing would have gone over commercially, since it would have been more expensive than the actual ’69 Grand Prix, and even with independent rear suspension, my strong suspicion would be that Pontiac would have found a way to make it ride and handle like any other big GM car, rendering it essentially another technological dead end, just in a different segment.

      2. no live axle to compete with cargo and passenger space

        Huge opportunity missed! The differential and axle hump made those forward-facing 3rd rows unusable by anyone over 4 feet with feet. We ended up with a ’73 Century wagon, which was a rattle-trap and strangled by smog gear, instead of a ginormous ’72 Estate Wagon. But look how many decades it took to put IRS on the profitable Tahoe.

    2. (Ford’s adoption of FWD is a more complicated story, some of which is discussed in the article on the Fiesta. Ford’s first foray into FWD was the Cardinal project, which became the German Taunus 12M/15M (P4 and P6). This was subsequently dropped in favor of the RWD Escort and a German version of the RWD Cortina, but Ford — very reluctantly — adopted a more modern transverse FWD layout for the Mk1 Fiesta in 1976, and then for the FWD Escort in 1981. The latter then spawned the larger Tempo/Topaz in the U.S. and the Ford Orion sedan in Europe. The Cardinal/Taunus P4/P6 was also sort of a dead end, especially considering that it was supposed to be offered in the U.S. and never was.)

  12. Wow – another thorough article. Even though I was quite into cars in the 1961-3 time-period, I had never heard the term “Polaris” or seen photos. Didn’t realize that the 326 started out as a 337 either.

    My recollection is that all 61/62 Tempests had the three chrome fingers in the cove behind the front wheel cutouts, and that all Le Mans cars had the rear fender peak moldings. I am surprised that the Pontiac was any longer than the Olds or Buick.

    Thanks again for such wonderful writing and insights.

  13. Back then I drove a ’61 or ’62 Tempest just one time. It must have been a base model because it was pretty plain inside. The nonmetallic beige paint didn’t help its looks. I remember it as being fast (for the time) and not quiet or smooth, and there was definitely a constant whine probably from a bad driveshaft bearing. So they didn’t necessarily last forever or even in that case very long.

  14. On perusing the bibliography, I realized that Hulki Aldikacti was one of three people whose names were on the patent for the torque tube. Of course, we know him as the father of the Pontiac Fiero.

    1. Yes, he had a long career at Pontiac.

  15. Disclosure: I am not a degreed mechanical engineer. You point out that with a transaxle “… the load on the synchronizers is greater because of the added inertia of the driveshaft.”

    Does it matter whether the clutch is directly behind the engine (Tempest, Porsche 924/944/968/928) or just ahead of the transaxle (Lancia Aurelia, Alfetta)? If it matters, which arrangement is easier on the syncros?

    1. There’s a discussion of this point in LJK Setright’s comments on the launch of the 928, in the 1977 Car and Driver preview test (which is currently available on their website). According to Setright, the tradeoff is something like this: All else being equal, putting the clutch behind the driveshaft puts less load on the synchronizers; the synchronizers have to handle the inertia of the clutch driven plate(s), but they have to do that even if the transmission is right behind or right next to the engine. However, in that case, the inertia of the driveshaft adds to the momentum the clutch has to absorb upon engagement, which tends to require an increase in its frictional area (usually by increasing diameter), and that can increase the load on the synchros. Putting the clutch ahead of the shaft reduces the load it has to carry (and simplifies its linkage, generally), but means the synchros have to carry the inertia of the driven plate(s) and the driveshaft, which makes it desirable to minimize the diameter of the shaft. (Porsche’s 928 shaft was much slimmer significantly thicker than Pontiac’s: 25mm.)

      Setright, it should be said, describes the torsional flexibility of a smaller-diameter shaft as an undesirable trait, but with the Pontiac, the shaft’s twisting was a deliberately engineered way of reducing some of the four-cylinder engine’s torsional vibration.

      1. 25mm is just shy of 1 inch (25.4 mm), so I’d say that based on the text, Pontiac’s various shafts were slimmer than Porsche’s. :)

        1. Argh, yes, I was not having a good math day on Monday, apparently. I amended my earlier comment.

  16. I’m surprised GM paid for new, single-year outer sheet metal for all three (Bill Mitchell insisted?) and new rear suspension for the Tempest in ’63, particularly if sales were disappointing. The only other single-yearers that come to mind are the high-volume ’58 Chevy/Pontiac and very-low-volume ’70 Toronado (not sure how much was new on the ’70 Riviera besides the awful fender skirts and front and rear).

    Something I hadn’t thought about is that in addition to the unibody Y body, Chevrolet went from Chevrolet + Corvette and trucks in ’59 to Chevrolet, Chevy II, the radical Corvair (and variants), and Chevelle in ’64. That’s a massive increase in GM products in a very few years, comparable to the switch to FWD X thru C body in the early 80s. Their engineering and manufacturing staffs must have been huge and very busy, yet afterwards slow to respond to the Mustang and Beetle. Exhausted?

    1. The sheet metal changes were not ultimately as dramatic from a tooling cost standpoint as they appeared. Even the ’63 was not a new shell, carrying over most of the really expensive sections with new outer panels. The latter were planned in 1960, before the cars went on sale, when division management started getting itchy about whether the Y-bodies were too small. (The divisions went through the five stages of grief in reverse with regard to the prospect of making real compacts.) At that time, the corporation expected that total volume was going to be better than it was, and that the teething pains of the aluminum V-8 would be worked out much more quickly than they were. Had the latter proved true and the Y-bodies been stronger sellers, the ’63 might have carried over an extra year, but the A-body seemed like an obviously better bet from a cost and profit standpoint, and so there was little to be gained by playing out the string. As for the ’63 Tempest’s new suspension, I can’t see the investment cost of that being particularly great. All it really amounted to was reshaped lower control arms in back, with the existing halfshafts, so it wasn’t meaningfully more expensive than the original suspension.

      The A-body project was a collaborative effort, and in many respects was closer to what the corporation had wanted to do with the Y-bodies, which ended up in a financially and commercially unfavorable position of having more commonality on the outside than the inside. The oddball, and the one that seems most like an extravagance from a cost and engineering standpoint, was the Chevy II, which was neither a spinoff of the Corvair nor a derivative of the A-body Chevelle. On the other hand, it’s important to grasp the size and scope of Chevrolet in those days: Its annual production exceeded the total annual output of the British industry, and its total employee population was something in excess of 200,000 (albeit spread out geographically to different plants and such). We tend to think of it in the same breath as Pontiac, Buick, etc., but it was much, much bigger, with commensurately more resources. This also sometimes made it more unwieldy, but there was a reason Chevrolet had its own engines and its own automatic transmission!

      Regarding responding to the Mustang and Beetle: The Corvair and Chevy II were both positioned as responses to the Beetle. (The Corvair was conceived before Volkswagen really took off, but during its production development, Chevrolet was obviously aware of Volkswagen at the center of the import surge.) They were very American responses — six cylinders rather than four, nominal six-passenger capacity, etc. — but they were domestic products, and they were aimed at American Volkswagen buyers more than at the C-segment Beetle itself, but they did have the desired effect, at least for a little while. As for the Mustang, until it actually went on sale, Chevrolet really thought it was just going to be a dressed-up Falcon Sprint, trying to carve itself off a bigger chunk of the Monza market. If you look at comparative sales for the Falcon Sprint and Monza in 1963, you can see why Chevrolet wasn’t worried, particularly since they had the pretty second-generation Corvair coming up. Once the Mustang actually debuted, alarm bells went off almost immediately and Chevrolet developed what became the F-body as quickly as production lead times allowed.

      1. I was thinking about the Vega response to VW’s surge in the mid 60s. Then as now, the Big 3 probably couldn’t figure out how to build a small, competitive, and inexpensive car at a profit with unionized labor and without cannibalizing too many more profitable sales. In the end, they could have just lightened and shrunk the Nova (like the Gremlin) and probably wouldn’t have turned off as many customers. Considering the risks and the amount of money involved, GM was pretty daring for the whole decade. The market (and govt) indicators were clearer in the mid 70s when they downsized then switched to FWD, finishing in time for gas prices to plummet.

        1. I think it’s important to recognize that the import boom, at least to the extent it represented a threat to Detroit, really had two distinct phases: the late fifties, during the recession, and then again in the latter sixties. The increase in import market share that had panicked the Big Three WAS largely abated after the Falcon, Corvair, and other domestic compacts arrived, so those models had been reasonably successful in their intended mission. That period was successful at establishing a growing presence for Volkswagen, but that wasn’t yet any cause for alarm; Detroit in general and GM in particular was generally pretty content to let what they saw as small fry have what they saw as niche markets (like sports cars). The manufacturers that became major players in the second phase of the boom hadn’t yet really established themselves (Toyota and Datsun were no threat to anyone but themselves in their initial forays into the North American market), and a lot of British and European automakers had failed to offer the kind of reliability and dealer networks that might have made them more viable here. Where things started to get harder was when the import market began to grow again in the late sixties as Baby Boomers reached driving age and started buying cars.

          The fundamental dilemma Volkswagen presented for Detroit is that it was a cultural icon in a way that did not significantly relate to its actual design or virtues as a car. It obviously had virtues (as Beetle fans hasten to insist any time anyone questions them), but its basic design was archaic and its deficiencies (in handling, in packaging, in performance) were substantial. What sold it was its reputation and the fact that it was obviously un-Detroit; this is particularly evident looking at Volkswagen’s trajectory in Europe, where it was going through an alarming decline that Heinz Nordhoff and Kurt Lotz didn’t know how to fix. These were things that were very, very difficult for Detroit to get their heads around from a conventional product planning standpoint. (Seeing Ford try to benchmark the Pinto to the ancient Beetle is so cringe-inducing that it causes physical pain.) In retrospect, a car like the early Toyota Corolla seems like the model Detroit should have been trying to emulate, but small, modern, conventional cars like the Ford Cortina hadn’t made a big splash in the U.S. compared to the Volkswagen, and Detroit couldn’t build or import them here for much less than the existing domestic compacts.

          The Vega was, for all its faults, an attractive car that handled well and was a workable compromise in utility and economy; consequently, it also sold quite well. Had it been better-built and more reliable, it would have been basically fine, and would probably be fondly remembered now rather as a kind of bonfire of Boomer goodwill. A shrunken Nova might have been more reliable, but not necessarily a better car in any other respect, a kind of Chevrolet Gremlin.

          1. For some VW owners, their ownership of a bug definitely had an element of reverse snobbery. Perhaps you were getting at this when you said it was obviously un-Detroit? Small Wonder, Walter Henry Nelson’s famous history of the bug, phrased it thus: some bug owners chose to show intellectual, not financial, wealth.

            In 1971 Road & Track published a comparison test of the Toyota Corona, Datsun 510, Vega, Pinto, and VW bug. They said the previous-generation Corona had been Chevrolet’s benchmark for quietness and refinement. At least, unlike Ford, Chevrolet chose the right benchmark. R&T also said Chevrolet had aimed at a moving target in this regard, but that’s another discussion.

          2. Yes, that’s exactly what I meant: The Beetle existed outside of the usual Detroit class hierarchies, and for many Americans was a way of signaling their rejection of those values — frugality over excess, durability over planned obsolescence, quality over gimmickry. Obviously, some people (especially those who bought a used Beetle) didn’t have any strong preconceived ideas about what the Beetle represented beyond being a cheap, economical small car with a decent repair record, but if all you wanted was a small car that got good gas mileage and didn’t cost much upfront, there were other, potentially much better choices by the late sixties or early seventies. That was the thing that I think really flummoxed Detroit product planners.

  17. I just want to state that I have been reading this wonderful article and the amazing comments and responses for the past hour or so in a state of nirvana. Thank you very much Ate Up With Motor for this article. I remember corresponding with you 5 years ago? about the rope drive as I thought it an interesting car. Your article, a tour de force, goes so far in explaining it’s intricacies and engineering rationales and compromises. Wonderful!!! I am not sure why I hadn’t seen it before now. Perhaps Curbside Classics has been capturing my attention. Anyway, thank you. I look forward to perusing your site to see what other gems you have to offer. You are without a doubt the best automotive long form writer I see. Have you written a book? Are you in process? If not, please do!!

    Also, thanks to all of the commentators for their learned and cogent comments. This is a great site with thoughtful people.

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