For those joining us late, the 924 was Porsche's third attempt at an entry-level model, following the 912 and the mid-engine 914. Although it shared its styling themes and front-engine/rear-transaxle layout with Porsche's not-yet-released 928, the 924 was originally designed for Volkswagen. When VW canceled the project at the eleventh hour, Zuffenhausen bought the rights and marketed it as a Porsche, starting in early 1976. The 924 sold well at first, but its lackluster performance and assortment of off-the-shelf Volkswagen parts -- particularly its engine, shared with VW's LT31 van -- alienated many purists, who declared that it was not a real Porsche. Despite an ambitious competition program, which included several runs at the 24 Hours of Le Mans, the 924's sales sank sharply in the early eighties, brought down by a global recession, skyrocketing prices, and a lingering lack of credibility.

In 1981, Porsche developed a new 2.5 L (151 cu. in.) four-cylinder engine, based on the V8 from the 928. Installed in a prototype 924 Carrera GTP, the new four made a promising showing at Le Mans that summer. At the Frankfurt auto show in September, Porsche announced that the 2.5 L engine would power a new model called 944, which subsequently debuted in May 1982 as an early 1983 model.

Calling the 944 a new model was slightly disingenuous. Despite the new engine, it was in many respects an evolutionary development of the 924. The 944's exterior styling, more aggressive than that of its predecessor, was based on the limited-production 924 Carrera GT, and its interior was largely the same as its predecessor's. Some of the Volkswagen hardware was gone, but, as with the final 356s of 20 years earlier, it was changed more in detail than design. The 944 was even assembled in the same plant as the 924, the Audi factory in Neckarsulm.

Nonetheless, the 944 did offer a number of definite improvements, particularly the new engine. With 143 hp (107 kW) in the U.S., 163 hp (122 kW) elsewhere, it was nearly as powerful as the old 924 Turbo, but with far less complexity and much more linear delivery. Porsche fans could also take solace in knowing that the new engine was designed and assembled in Zuffenhausen before being trucked to Neckarsulm for installation.


The 944's engine, a 2.5 L (151 cu. in.) SOHC four, was based on the 4.7 L (283 cu. in.) V8 of the contemporary 928, although very few parts are actually interchangeable. It had twin balance shafts to smooth the inherent shake of a big inline four. Note the unusual bumper design; the front and rear bumpers of the 924 and 944 are carried on hydraulic struts to meet U.S. 5-mph (8-kph) crash standards.

The 944's starting price, around $19,000 in the U.S., split the difference between the 924 and the 924 Turbo. That was hardly cheap (about $41,000 in modern dollars), but at least it wasn't dramatically more expensive than the Chevrolet Corvette or Datsun 280ZX Turbo, as the 924 Turbo had been. Performance was now adequate, with 0-62 mph (0-100 kph) in less than nine seconds. U.S. models could reach close to 125 mph (200 kph), while Autocar took a European model to more than 135 mph (217 kph). Brakes were much improved over the early 924, and handling was better than ever. Despite its unpretentious, VW-derived suspension (with MacPherson struts in front, semi-trailing arms in back), the 944 had excellent weight distribution, sharp steering, and well-tuned spring and damping rates, making it very agile. In August 1984, Car and Driver named the 944 the best-handling car in America, over a host of formidable rivals, including the Audi Quattro, the Lotus Esprit, and the new Chevrolet Corvette (C4).

The 944's most important quality, however, had nothing to do with power or handling: it was Porsche's success in establishing it as a new model, distinct from the 924. Considering the 944's evolutionary styling, little-changed interior, and carryover Audi transmissions, it was a remarkable marketing coup. The same critics who had savaged the 924 as a pretender happily embraced the 944 as a true Porsche, worthy of its illustrious brand. At a stroke, the 924's sins had been expunged.


The early 944s are actually a little shorter than the 924 -- 168.9 inches (4,290 mm), compared to 170.1 inches (4,320 mm) -- but the wheelbase is identical. The overall shape is quite similar to the 924, but the 944 has a wider nose and significantly wider track; in profile, you can see the visible flaring of the fenders.

The 944 arrived just as the economy was recovering from its fin-de-decade slump. As fears of a renewed energy crisis faded, well-heeled buyers were again spending money. Many of those buyers were Baby Boomers, now in their thirties and forties, and getting their first taste of real affluence. The new breed of yuppies was eager for symbols of prosperity and achievement, but unlike their parents, they had little interest in traditional American icons like Cadillacs. They sought out European brands like Mercedes and BMW, with their higher perceived quality and great snob appeal.

It was a boom time for Porsche. Since the press had duly ordained the 944 a proper Porsche, buyers no longer needed to worry about some wag calling their car a glorified Volkswagen. The fact that the 944 was not as fast as a Corvette was beside the point. It was a Porsche, and even neophytes knew what that meant.

Porsche sales were predictably robust. In 1984, the 944's best year, Porsche sold 26,539 of them, about 60% in the U.S. Porsche's total sales climbed from 31,734 in 1981 to 54,458 in 1985. By 1986, Porsche AG's total revenue had hit a record DM 3.7 billion ($1.7 billion).


The 944's most distinctive styling feature was its rear spoiler, originally introduced on the earlier 924 Turbo (937). Porsche deleted this spoiler from the 968, which may not have been the best move from an aesthetic or branding standpoint. The 944's five-speed transaxle was still essentially the same Audi-based unit introduced on the 924 in 1980. A three-speed automatic, also from Audi, was optional, but rarely ordered.

Those were extremely gratifying results for Peter Schutz, who had become Porsche president and chairman in the fall of 1981. Schutz had pushed for a greater emphasis on the U.S. market, and he had canceled plans for a cheaper entry-level model, arguing that Porsche didn't need it. Flush with success, he invested over DM 1 billion ($400 million) in facilities like a new wind tunnel and a new paint shop, and he brought in consultants from Booz Allen & Hamilton to streamline Porsche's R&D operations. He also authorized expensive new projects, like the limited-production 959 supercar; a new line of twin-turbo 911s called Type 965; and a faster, turbocharged 944, known internally as the 951.

The 944 Turbo appeared in 1985 as a 1986 model, a few months after the 944 received a mid-'85 makeover that smoothed out its styling and banished the last traces of 924 from its interior. Like the earlier 924 Carrera GT, the new Turbo had a single KKK turbocharger and an air-to-air intercooler. The turbocharger's electronically controlled wastegate allowed up to 10.9 lb (0.75 bar) of boost, producing 217 hp SAE (162 kW), 60 more than the standard engine. Since the Turbo was only about 120 lb (55 kg) heavier, it was dramatically faster than the normally aspirated 944. The Turbo could do 0-60 mph (0-97 kph) in about six seconds, with a top speed of over 150 mph (240 kph), making it as fast as the far more expensive Porsche 928S. Tires, brakes, suspension, and transmission were beefed up commensurately, and the Turbo got a new front clip that trimmed its drag coefficient from 0.35 to 0.33.


The easiest way to identify the 944 Turbo (known to the factory and Porsche cognoscenti as 951) is the smooth polyurethane/fiberglass cover over the bumper. Other changes included stronger gearbox synchros, revised gearing, bigger vented disc brakes, and 16-inch wheels, rather than the 15s standard on lesser 944s. Anti-lock brakes and driver- and passenger-side airbags became standard in 1987. (Photo © 2009 Bamidele O. Shangobunmi; used by permission)

The critics, who were already fond of the 944, were predictably ecstatic. Fast Lane called the 944 Turbo the best car in the world. Car and Driver was less willing to excuse its turbo lag and lackluster low-end power, but agreed with Road & Track that it was a better value than the 928S. That was just as well, because the Turbo was around 35% more expensive than the standard 944: around $30,000 in the U.S., £25,000 in the UK (close to $60,000 in modern dollars). Nevertheless, dealers soon had waiting lists for the new car, which accounted for more than 10,000 sales in 1986.

Value for money was becoming a sensitive issue for the standard 944, as well, thanks to the strong deutsche mark. The exchange rate of the DM to the dollar went from an average of 2.55 in 1983 to 1.92 at the start of 1987. Porsche responded by hiking its prices in most export markets. In America, a basic 944 climbed to nearly $25,000, uncomfortably close to the much faster Corvette, and over $6,000 more than the new Mazda RX-7 Turbo, which even looked a lot like a 944. Porsche became nervous enough that it reintroduced the 924S (which had remained in limited production in other markets) to the U.S. in mid-1986. The 924S using the 944's engine, but had the body and interior of the old 924, priced about $5,000 below the 944.

Porsche further hedged its bets late in the year with the 944S, a normally aspirated car with a new DOHC 16-valve cylinder head that bumped power to 188 hp SAE (140 kW). Priced halfway between the 944 and the Turbo, it also split their virtues. It was not as anemic at low speeds as the Turbo, but it was noticeably peakier than the basic car. The 944S sold slightly better than the Turbo, accounting for about 25% of total sales.

The 944's popularity was tied to the economic boom of the mid-eighties, and it proved to be just as ephemeral. In October 1987, stock markets around the world suffered their steepest losses since 1929. The U.S. Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 22%, and some markets dropped by more than twice that figure.

The stock market crash was a jarring reminder for Porsche of just how dependent it had become on status-conscious yuppies. As those buyers watched their paper fortunes collapse, they quickly lost interest in expensive four-wheeled toys. The continued strength of the mark relative to the dollar made matters worse, forcing another round of price hikes in export markets. By the time the market crashed, a 924S was up to $25,000 in the U.S., while the 944 Turbo was close to $40,000. Sales fell sharply, particularly in America.


Midway through the 1985 model year, all 944s got a number of minor styling revisions, including a flush windshield, and a completely new interior. The redesigned cabin was a great improvement over the earlier cars, but the arrangement of some minor controls was still rather peculiar. Turbos, like this one, were almost the same, but added a turbo boost gauge. (Photo © 2009 Bamidele O. Shangobunmi; used by permission)

Two years earlier, Peter Schutz had looked like a genius, but now his star was falling. Schutz had always had good relationships with Porsche's engineers, but the board, and particularly the Porsche family, had never been entirely comfortable with him. Schutz was perhaps too brash for their tastes, too American. He was a Berliner by birth, but he grew up in Chicago, and had worked for Caterpillar and Cummins in the U.S. before returning to Germany. The board tolerated him as long as he was making money, but as soon as business went sour, they seemed to lose faith. The West German press was similarly critical, particularly of Schutz's decision to invest heavily in facilities without a strong product plan. Schutz had decided not to develop a cheaper entry-level car, and a lot of the product development he had approved was focused at the high end, expensive supercars like the 959 and 965. Porsche's existing product line was far from robust; he 928 had never been a strong seller, the 911 had been hit and miss, and 944 sales were sinking rapidly.

At the end of the year, the board called for Schutz's resignation; finance director Heinz Branitzki replaced him as CEO in January 1988. Branitzki was caustic about Schutz's America-first policy, declaring that Porsche would welcome American sales, but would no longer court the yuppie market. Under pressure to cut costs, Branitzki hired a new round of consultants to review Porsche's bookkeeping and purchasing for potential savings. He canceled the 924S, the twin-turbo 965/969, and a number of planned 928 derivatives. More controversially, he pushed technical director Helmuth Bott to resign in September 1988, replacing him with Ulrich Bez, previously the head of BMW Technik.

Porsche tried to boost interest in the 944 with its usual formula of performance increases and incremental improvements. Most notably, anti-lock brakes and driver and passenger air bags became available in 1987, and a hotter limited-production Turbo S appeared in 1988.

Bez considered several alternatives to the 944's four-cylinder engine, including a DOHC version of the Peugeot-Renault-Volvo V6; BMW's new M50 inline-six; and even a 2.7 L (164 cu. in.) version of the 3.6 L (220 cu. in.) V8 then in development for Porsche's planned 989 four-door sedan. None of those plans came to fruition, so for 1989, Porsche bored out the base 944's engine to 2.7 L (164 cu. in.), boosting the base model to 162 hp (121 kW). The 944, now called 944S2, was stroked to 3.0 L (182 cu. in.), giving it 208 hp SAE (211 hp DIN; 155 kW) without a turbocharger; it also got the Turbo's front clip. The standard Turbo got the improvements of the previous Turbo S, taking it to 247 hp SAE (184 kW).

The new engines, along with the introduction of a new 944S2 Cabriolet, temporarily revived 944 sales, which climbed from around 10,000 in 1988 to over 22,000 in 1989. Porsche's total U.S. sales remained gloomy, falling from almost 16,000 to about 9,500. The problem remained price. The 944S2 was now over $45,000 in the U.S., the Turbo $47,600, and the Cabriolet nearly $53,000. Unless you were deeply enamored of the Porsche badge, that was a lot of money for a four-cylinder sports car. Making matters worse was a new American luxury tax on cars over $30,000, which added an additional $1,500 or more to the bottom line.


The 944S2 Cabriolet's top was developed by the American Sunroof Corporation (ASC). The 944 (and later 968) Cabriolet was exceptionally solid for an open-topped car, but the top was fussy and inconvenient, requiring an Allen wrench to detach the top from the windshield frame before you could activate the power mechanism; the tonneau cover was even worse. At a time when the Mercedes SL (R129) offered a one-button mechanism to lower the top and snap the rigid tonneau in place, this was a rather retrograde step. (Photo © 2007 Rudolf Strickler; used under a Creative Commons Attribution ShareAlike 3.0 license)

For 1990, Branitzki decided to streamline production by eliminating the base 944, leaving the S2 and Turbo. It may have sounded like a good idea on paper, but dropping the cheapest models of a line already criticized as overpriced had predictable effects. Total 944 production fell to 8,510, despite significant price cuts. Only 2,273 of those were sold in the U.S., 1,060 in Britain.

Inevitably, none of this helped Porsche's flagging fortunes. Branitzki had cut costs somewhat, but the company's 1989 earnings were still only DM 2.48 billion ($1.48 billion), barely two-thirds of their 1986 peak. The board pushed Branitzki to retire in January 1990, replacing him with another outsider, Arno Bohn, from the computer company Nixdorf.

After Bohn's arrival, there was an internal debate over the future of the 944. It was still too expensive, and there was strong competition from an array of increasingly credible Japanese rivals, like the new Nissan 300ZX Twin Turbo. Furthermore, it was getting old -- for all its tweaks and enhancements, its basic shape still went back to the early seventies. Nevertheless, Bohn was resistant to the idea of a new low-priced car, declaring that Porsche's entry-level buyers simply bought used Porsches instead of new ones.

Ulrich Bez had been pushing for a serious update of the 944 since his arrival, but he had met considerable resistance from production chief Rudi Noppen. Bez eventually had to put together his own engineering team to handle the revamp, which resulted in extensive changes. The 3.0 L (182 cu. in.) four was now up to 236 hp SAE (240 hp DIN, 176 kW), thanks to a variable valve timing system called VarioCam. A new, Porsche-designed six-speed manual replaced the older, Audi-based transaxle, and a four-speed Tiptronic automatic, developed by Porsche, ZF, and Bosch, was newly optional. The suspension was refined, as well, preserving the 944's agility while taking the flinty edge off its ride quality. Despite a very modest budget, Porsche claimed that 82% of the car was new.


The 968's new nose was apparently inspired by the abortive 965, although its flip-up headlights give it a certain resemblance to the 928 -- not necessarily a good thing, given the 928's moribund sales. The 968's engine, fitted with twin counter-rotating balance shafts, is remarkably smooth for an inline four of such large displacement, although it was never quite as sweet as a six of the same size.

Harm Lagaay, the Dutch stylist who designed the original 924 back in the early seventies, had returned to Porsche in 1989 as chief designer. Lagaay didn't have the budget for a complete redesign of the 944, but he and designers Dick Soderberg and Tony Hatter gave it an extensive facelift, with new, exposed flip-up headlamps. The interior was almost unchanged, another reflection of the limited funds.

The new car was originally supposed to be the 944S3, but with 944 sales tanking, it seemed a good time for a new designation. Rather than 944, Porsche used its internal type number: 968. Unlike the 924 and 944, it was produced in Zuffenhausen; building cars through Audi or Volkswagen factories had become too expensive.

The 968 went on sale in 1991 as a 1992 model. The 968 coupe started at just under $40,000, about $3,500 less than the last 944Ss. The Cabriolet, which arrived somewhat later, was again over $50,000.

The 968 was certainly a better car than its predecessor, with dramatically improved performance. Capable of 0-60 mph (0-97 kph) in less than six seconds and a top speed of more than 150 mph (240 kph), it was about as fast as the old 944 Turbo S. Nonetheless, the 968 sold even worse than the 944S2. Worldwide production for 1992 was only 5,353, dropping to 3,783 for 1993.

Porsche had managed to remain profitable in 1990, albeit barely, but it posted a net loss for 1991. Arno Bohn tried to put a brave face on the losses, announcing in January 1992 that the company would cap annual production at 30,000 units, supposedly to preserve exclusivity. Still, many observers wondered if Porsche would be bought out (Daimler-Benz being the most likely buyer), or end up as little more than an engineering consultancy for other automakers, as it had been before World War 2.

Porsche's losses provoked yet another round of management changes. Ulrich Bez was forced out in September 1991; he went on to become VP of engineering for Daewoo, and then chairman of Aston Martin Lagonda. In October, Porsche hired Wendelin Wiedeking, chairman of the parts supplier Glyco, as its new production chief, with a mandate to cut costs by 30%.

In early 1992, Arno Bohn did a volte-face on the question of an entry-level car, approving the development of a new model called Type 986. That spring, Harm Legaay's team started work on design studies for the 986, which eventually became the Porsche Boxster.

The Porsche family, which still dominated the firm's supervisory board, was not satisfied with Bohn's performance. In February 1992, they declined to renew his contract, and offered his position to Wolfgang Reitzle of BMW, a controversial move among Porsche staff. When Reitzle declined the offer, the board extended Bohn's contract through 1995.

That apparently displeased Ferdinand Piëch, the grandson of Ferdinand Porsche. Piëch had been a Porsche engineer in the sixties and seventies before joining Volkswagen (of which he became chairman in January 1993), and he still owned 10% of Porsche, in addition to holding a seat on the board. In September, Piëch managed to force Bohn's resignation; Wendelin Wiedeking became Porsche's new chairman.


The 968's structural kinship with the 944 is evident in its unchanged greenhouse and very similar dimensions. It's 170.9 in (4,320 mm) long on a 94.5-inch (2,400-mm) wheelbase, 2 inches (51 mm) longer than a 944S2. It is somewhat heavier than the 944, although at around 3,100 lb (1,405 kg), it's still significantly lighter than a contemporary Corvette or most of its Japanese rivals.

Wiedeking pushed for a massive upheaval of Porsche's entire operation, implementing a new strategy called Porsche-Verbesserungs-Prozesses (Porsche Improvement Process, or PVP). He hired a pair of Japanese consultants, Yoshiki Iwata and Chihiro Nakao, to train Porsche's engineers in Toyota-style lean production methods. It was a difficult process, not least because it resulted the layoffs of more than 2,500 employees, nearly 35% of the company's total headcount. Meanwhile, Porsche's volume continued to fall, tumbling to less than 6,600 in 1992.

In January 1993, Porsche previewed the Boxster at the Detroit Auto Show. Although it was officially a show car, development of the 986 had already been going on for six months. Porsche promised that the production Boxster would have a proper Porsche engine -- a new water-cooled flat six -- and that it would cost around $40,000, no more than the 968 coupe.

The fate of the 968 was sealed by the time the Boxster appeared in Detroit. The 968 and the even slower-selling 928 would remain on sale through 1995, but they had already been canceled, and there would be no replacements.

U.S. 968s had few changes during their short life, other than an optional sport suspension package, added in 1993, and an optional Torsen limited-slip differential, introduced in 1994. In other markets, Porsche offered a lightweight 968 Club Sport model, stripped of some standard equipment and fitted with Recaro sport seats, a sport suspension, and bigger brakes. A cheaper, de-contented Sport model was added in some markets in early 1994. There was also a tiny handful (perhaps 15 or 16) of 968 Turbo S models, with 305 hp (228 kW), and three 968 Turbo RS cars, built for Germany's ADAC GT racing series.


The 968's squared-off tail, similar to that of the 944S2, but without the 944's traditional wraparound spoiler, makes it feel more massive than the bigger, heavier 928 -- not an entirely happy feeling in a sports car. Like the 924 and 944, the 968 still used a simple semi-trailing arm rear suspension, with transverse torsion bar springs. It handled superbly, but some rivals with more sophisticated multi-link and double-wishbone rear suspensions could match its cornering ability while providing a suppler ride.

Despite those special editions, the final 968s sold poorly. Worldwide sales for 1994 were less than 2,500, and total sales for 1995 were only 1,156. By the time production ended in 1995, the high-end sports car market had virtually collapsed. Whether the 968 was a good value compared to competitors like the Toyota Supra Turbo and twin-turbo Mazda RX-7 was really a moot point. The Japanese had suffered the same sort of exchange-rate problems that had afflicted Porsche, and their sales had fallen as prices rose. The only sports car in this class to survive the nineties was the Corvette, which appealed to a somewhat different demographic.

The irony is that the 968 was in many ways the car critics thought the 924 and 944 should have been from the start. It was fast, handled very well, and it was finally free of the VW parts bin stigma. Unfortunately, the 968 and its Japanese rivals were now too expensive for most of the buyers who wanted such a car. Buyers who had the wherewithal to spend $40,000 or $50,000 on a car now preferred their rolling status symbols with a proper back seat, and, increasingly, four-wheel drive. The 968 came about as close to perfecting the 924 concept as anyone ever would, but by then, no one seemed interested.

In July 1996, about a year after the demise of the 968, Porsche unveiled the production version of the Boxster. As they had promised, its base price was just under $40,000, about $30 more than the last 968 coupe. The critical and commercial response was enthusiastic, and the Boxster sold strongly from the beginning. The current version, only mildly revised, remains very popular.

Thanks to the Boxster and the subsequent 996, the first water-cooled 911, Porsche's total production was back up to nearly 50,000 units by 2000, and the company was posting record profits. Wendelin Wiedeking himself benefited tremendously, since his contract paid him 0.9% of the company's net profits. Eager for yet more volume, he initiated the controversial Cayenne sport-utility vehicle -- again in collaboration with Volkswagen -- and later the Panamera, a four-door sedan like the aborted 989.

Wiedeking ultimately overextended himself with a complicated scheme to seize control of Volkswagen. The plan backfired, leaving Porsche some €11.4 billion ($16 billion) in debt. The Porsche supervisory board forced Wiedeking to resign on July 24, 2009. (He will not be going hungry; his compensation for 2008 was €77.4 million (about $113 million) and he received a €50 million ($71 million) severance package.)

We mentioned in the first part of this article that Porsche and Volkswagen were once joined at the hip. As of this writing, Volkswagen now expects to buy a 49.9% stake in Porsche before the end of 2009. On November 24, the Porsche board appointed former VW chairman Martin Winterkorn as Porsche's new CEO, replacing interim chairman Michael Macht.

Thanks to these machinations, it's very likely that there will be other "Volks-Porsches" in the future, along the lines of the original 924. Rumors are already flying that Porsche will launch a cheaper entry-level car based on the platform of the Mk 6 Golf and Volkswagen Scirocco. Given the companies' histories, perhaps it's inevitable.

A writer of our acquaintance once asked a colleague these challenging questions about a new product: "Who is this aimed at, and who do you think is buying it?" Porsche has struggled with those same questions since at least the 1960s. Its fans have very specific ideas about what a Porsche is supposed to be (a serious driving machine, preferably with a rear-mounted boxer engine) and whom it is supposed to be for (hardcore driving enthusiasts). The history of the 924, 944, and 968, however, suggests something quite different. People bought the 924 and 944, when they did, because they were Porsches, and because they were relatively affordable. Any other virtues (and any other deficiencies) were strictly incidental. The same is true of the Boxster, which admittedly has the additional advantages of being a convertible and rather pretty.

Wendelin Wiedeking figured out that secret about a decade ago, and to test the theory, he gave us the grotesque Cayenne, a vehicle that's about as far from Porsche's ostensible brand values as you can get. People bought it anyway, in part because it was expensive and ostentatious, in part because it was the first Porsche with a back seat big enough for grown-ups. Now we have the Panamera sedan, which is only marginally less visually offensive, and will probably also sell like mad.

As we've said before, we've never been overly fond of Porsches in general; even the mighty 959 impresses us more as an exercise in technological overkill than anything else. Nevertheless, we have a soft spot for the 944, despite its yuppie-bauble image. It was agile without being abusive, admirably free of gimmicks, and still makes many sports coupes seem cumbersome. It was overpriced and not particularly fast (which could also be said of a 4WS Prelude we used to own, whose virtues were not dissimilar), but it had a certain no-nonsense directness that we still appreciate. We wouldn't want to own one, mostly because the price of banishing the Volkswagen hardware was a return to Porsche's customarily horrifying running costs, but of all the Porsches built to date, it comes closest to our personal tastes. This, in turn, probably explains why we're not rich...

# # #

Our principal sources for this article included the Auto Editors of Consumer Guide, Porsche Chronicle (Lincolnwood, IL: Publications International, Ltd., 1995) and Karl Ludvigsen, "The Turbo That Never Was," Excellence, June 2005, pp. 111-116; the latter article was adapted from an earlier edition of Ludvigsen's book, Porsche: Excellence Was Expected: The Comprehensive History of the Company, its Cars and its Racing Heritage (Cambridge, MA: Bentley Publishers, 2008). Some additional information on the Wiedeking era came from John Lamm, Porsche Boxster (Colortech) (Osceola, WI: MBI Publishing, 1998). Additional technical details came from the 924/944/968 Frequently Asked Questions page (Version 1.8.9, 15 July 2009, http://www.connact.com/~kgross/FAQ/944faq.html, accessed 15 November 2009), with some details from Mike Covello, Standard Catalog of Imported Cars 1946-2002 (Iola, WI: Krause Publications, 2001; Second Edition). Production numbers came from the "Porsche 944" Wikipedia entry (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Porsche_944, accessed 15 November 2009) and the entry "Porsche 968" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Porsche_968, accessed 15 November 2009).

Information on Porsche's current predicament came from DPA, "VW moves in for the kill as Porsche chief steps down" (23 July 2009, Earthtimes, http://www.earthtimes.org/articles/news/278644,vw-moves-in-for-the-kill-as-porsche-chief-steps.html, accessed 23 November 2009); Carter Dougherty, "Wendelin Wiedeking" (23 July 2009, New York Times, http://topics.nytimes.com/ topics/reference/timestopics/people/w/ wendelin_wiedeking/index.html, accessed 23 November 2009); Greg Kable, "Porsche chief Wendelin Wiedeking resigns" (23 July 2009, AutoWeek, http://www.autoweek.com/article/20090723/CARNEWS/907239998, accessed 23 November 2009); and "Winterkorn and Pötsch join Board of Management of Porsche SE" (24 November 2009, Volkswagen AG, http://www.volkswagenag.com/vwag/ vwcorp/info_center/en/news/2009/11/board_of_management_of_porsche_se.html, accessed 25 November 2009).

Data on historical exchange rates of the mark to the dollar came from Harold Marcuse, "Historical Dollar-to-Marks Currency Conversion Page" (19 August 2005, UC Santa Barbara, http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/projects/currency.htm, accessed 5 December 2009). Inflation estimates came from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Inflation Calculator, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl.

The title for these articles was suggested by a lyric of the David & David song "Welcome to the Boomtown," composed by David Baerwald and David Ricketts, which appeared on their 1986 album Boomtown.

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