She Likes Whips and Chains: The Pleasures and Pains of the Citroën SM PDF Print E-mail

Tags: 1970s | Citroën | French cars | front-wheel drive | Italian cars | Maserati

Written by Aaron Severson   
Sunday, 07 September 2008 12:44

Our more cosmopolitan readers are no doubt aware that "S/M" can be shorthand for sadomasochism (the enjoyment of inflicting and receiving pain). That alternate meaning makes the designation of the Citroën SM all the more piquant, for although the goal of this ne plus ultra of Citroëns was high-speed comfort, its design was every bit as adventuresome (and as kinky) as the name implies. And, as we'll see, it also involved more than a little pain for everyone involved...

1972 Citroen SM badge

LIVING ON THE EDGE

If you've read our histories of the Traction Avant and DS, you already have a picture of Citroën in its heyday: daring engineering, take-no-prisoners design, and a fearless contempt for popular opinion. The engineers and designers of Automobiles Citroën routinely took chances that would've left even the most maverick of U.S. auto executives quavering in mortal terror. To say that Citroëns were iconoclastic is like saying a Top Fuel dragster is quick -- it's certainly true, but it lacks any sense of proportion.

The surest evidence of just how advanced the DS really was back in 1955 is that fifteen years later, when Citroën launched a new model with most of the same features and hardware, it was still hailed as revolutionary. Even more remarkably, the Déesse was originally intended not as an exotic sports car or an executive limousine, but as a family sedan. The "Goddess" had disc brakes and fully independent suspension at a time when Ferraris and Rolls-Royces still had drum brakes and live axles. (In fact, Rolls was later to license Citroën's self-leveling system, after being unable to concoct anything as effective on its own.) By the conservative standards of conventional automotive product planning, Citroën's approach was utter madness, and it undoubtedly limited their products' appeal to more timid shoppers.

If the DS was a family car, what would Citroën concoct if it really did try to build a luxury GT? Buyers shopping in that rarefied but profitable class tend to be more intrigued than offended by the unusual (or even the outright bizarre), if it seems like it will wow the neighbors. They're also more willing to pay a premium for exotic specification; an important detail, since extravagant specifications tend to push the price tag well beyond the level of proletarian transportation. That affluent market was the target for the SM -- one of the last, and certainly the mightiest, of classic Citroëns.

1972 Citroën SM front 3q view
The most conventional aspect of the SM is its transmission. Most had a new five-speed manual with a conventional clutch (fortunately not the DS's peculiar semi-automatic four-speed). A Borg-Warner three-speed automatic became available later in the model run. The automatic added about a second and a half to the SM's 0-60 mph (0-97 kph) times and cut its fuel economy a bit. Although Europeans considered it a thirsty car, the SM was not unreasonably fuelish compared to American cars of its performance, returning around 16 mpg (14.7 L/100 km) in fast driving and as much as 22 mpg (10.7 L/100 km) at cruising speeds.

THE SPORTING LIFE

The DS was many things, but it was not quick. Outright speed had never been a Citroën priority, but critics generally agreed that the engine was the DS's weakest link, and more than a few pined for a smoother, stronger engine. British race builder Connaught had already offered a number of souped-up conversions of Déesses and Idées, and it's surprising that the factory was so slow to follow suit. Indeed, Citroën chief engineer Jacques Né had been lobbying for a more powerful DS for some time before the SM project was launched.

The big priority at Citroën in the mid-sixties, however, was not on enhancing existing models, but on expansion. Chairman Pierre Bercot was confident in the continued viability of the DS and the 2CV minicar, but there was a yawning chasm between them in price, which unfortunately represented the meatiest part of the European market. The Déesse, meanwhile, was a viable competitor for cars like BMW and Jaguar in terms of luxury and roadability, but it didn't have the performance to qualify as a true prestige car.

To address this shortfall, Né's concepts of a more powerful DS evolved into a new model, a top-of-the-line flagship, the ultimate Citroën. There was a certain amount of national prestige in the offing; France hadn't really had a credible offering in the grande routière class since Delage, Delahaye, and Bugatti faded away after the war, leaving the field to the British, the Italians, and the Germans. Not only would such a car be a feather in Citroën's cap, it would restore a certain honor to the French auto industry.

The plan was for the SM to use much of the hardware already developed for the Déesse, but it would need a new engine -- Citroën engineer Walter Becchia had continued to work on six-cylinder designs since the failure of the flat-six originally planned for the DS, but those designs had come to naught. Pierre Bercot turned instead to the source of many fine GT engines: Italy.

1972 Citroën SM hood scoop
The hood scoop, which incorporates Citroën's distinctive twin-chevron emblem, feeds the ventilation system, not the engine. The Maserati V6 under the hood originally displaced 2.7 L (163 cu. in.), making 170 net horsepower (127 kW) with three two-throat Webers. Late in 1972, it traded the carburetors for Bosch fuel injection. The injection system added eight horsepower and did wonders for the engine's tractability and emissions, although it was never certified for the U.S. Towards the end of the SM's run, a 180-horsepower (134 kW) 3.0L (181 cu. in.) carbureted version was offered in certain export markets; it was too big to be economically viable in France.

THE ITALIAN JOB

In January 1968, Citroën purchased a controlling interest in the Italian sports car manufacturer Maserati. The acquisition followed the absorption of the French automaker Panhard and the truck manufacturer Berliet, all of which was financed by selling a 26% stake in Citroën to Fiat. In short order, Bercot set Maserati to work designing a V6 engine for the SM. The engine project was a daunting endeavor because of its stringent requirements: the new engine had to be exceptionally compact and lightweight; it could displace no more than 2.8 liters (171 cu. in.), a threshold beyond which French tax laws became too onerous, even for a luxury car; and it needed to be ready in only six months. The project nearly led to a mutiny among the Italian engineers, who didn't take kindly to the demands and arrogance of their new French masters. Amazingly, Maserati chief engineer Giulio Alfieri had a design ready in a matter of weeks, although it involved some compromises that later proved troublesome.

Most of the rest of the car's engineering was familiar, to Citroën engineers, if not to the rest of the world. Suspension was largely the same as the DS, refined to eliminate a few of the Déesse's foibles and to suit the SM's more sporting intent. Brakes, too, were similar to the DS, although the SM got discs at all four wheels, reflecting its greater speed potential. Front-wheel drive was likewise carried over, as was the high-pressure central hydraulic system, which no other automaker other than Mercedes had dared to imitate. As before, the hydraulics powered suspension, brakes, and steering. The latter, dubbed VariPower, was now provided with a much faster ratio, a self-centering action (if you cranked the wheel around with the engine running, it would return to the center by itself), and a novel speed-variable system that reduced steering assist at higher speeds.

The SM was a big car for a contemporary European coupe. It was a bit longer overall than the DS, although its wheelbase was some seven inches (175 mm) shorter. It was also about 300 pounds (135 kg) heavier than the DS. Like its sedan predecessor, the SM used unitary construction, although it omitted the Déesse's unusual bolt-on fenders in favor of fully stressed steel body panels. In the Citroën fashion, it was designed for aerodynamic efficiency, the company claiming that its drag was 25% lower than the already-slick Déesse. That was unlikely (the most reliable figure we've found for its coefficient of drag was 0.336, still a highly creditable figure), but it was still among the most streamlined cars on the road.

1972 Citroën SM rear view
The chopped-off "Kammback" tail was the most controversial aspect of the SM's styling. It was there purely for aerodynamic reason; the abrupt drop-off was intended to provide most of the aerodynamic effect of a teardrop shape, without the extra length and otherwise useless mass of a long, narrow tail. The SM's tail is a hatchback, increasing the utility of its modest trunk.

2004 Honda Insight rear 3q view
Honda's Insight hybrid also used a Kamm tail and skirted rear wheels, for much the same reasons as the SM. The Insight's coefficient of drag is only 0.25, among the lowest of any modern production car.

PROVOCATEUR

When the SM made its debut at the Geneva auto show in 1970, the motoring press was once again blinded with science. The SM's hydropneumatic suspension, though not much changed from the original DS in principle, was still a wonder. Front-wheel drive remained novel in those days, particularly for a car of this size and power. The uncanny self-centering, variable-assist steering, with only two turns from lock to lock (more than 50% quicker than most modern cars), met even greater wonderment. Added to the cachet of its Italian engine -- with the Maserati trident proudly adorning each valve cover -- the SM emerged as an impressive achievement.

1970 Citroën SM with Euro headlights
European SMs had six Cibié quartz-iodine headlights, covered by an aerodynamic glass fairing. The inner pair was steered with the front wheels, like later DS models, providing better illumination on curving country roads. Production SMs initially had the yellow-tinted lights required by French law, which critics felt were inferior to white lights (although they were better in fog or rain). (Photo © 2006 PLawrence99cx; released to the public domain by the photographer)


1972 Citroën SM front view
The front end of a U.S.-market SM, with only four sealed-beam headlamps, looks somewhat vacant compared to its European counterpart. The European SM's movable driving lights were not legal in the U.S., nor was the transparent cover over the headlights. In fact, even the European car's quartz-iodine lights were not legal in the States until the 1980s, thanks to archaic American lighting regulations authored before World War Two. Note the grille under the bumper; like most modern cars, the SM is a "bumper breather," taking its intake and radiator air from this high-pressure area.


Even if it had been as conventional as a '55 Chevy under the skin, the SM would have knocked 'em dead in Geneva based on its looks alone. Primarily the work of Citroën styling chief Robert Opron, it was as visually confrontational as running through the Republican National Convention in full leather-fetish gear. Its only vaguely orthodox aspect was its long-nose/short-deck proportions, dictated more by the front-drive layout (which still placed the transmission ahead of the engine, like the Traction Avant) than any concern for contemporary fashion. That it was sleek, bold, and imposing, no one could argue; whether it was attractive was another question entirely. Many contemporary observers liked the imposing nose of the European car, which had no less than six Cibié halogen headlights, the inner pair swiveling with the front wheels. The angular, chopped-off tail -- an aerodynamic feature known as a Kamm tail -- was less favorably received, many calling it busy and awkward. Two things were beyond question: first, that the SM was as provocative as any of the edgy show cars then emerging from Italy; and second, that it could be nothing other than a Citroën.

The SM was quite an expensive car, starting around 52,000 FF in France (around $9,500 at contemporary exchange rates). In the U.S., its price started at a sizable $11,800, which was about $2,000 more than a well-equipped Cadillac Eldorado. British buyers were soaked for £5,200, including purchase tax, equivalent to around $13,000, and Citroën did not even deign to offer a right-hand-drive model. Such prices put the SM in the realm of the BMW 3.0 CS, Mercedes 350SLC, Porsche 911, and even Ferrari's V6 Dino 246 -- heady company indeed.

1972 Citroën SM rear 3q view
The SM is quite a bit bigger than its most direct contemporary rival, the BMW CS coupe -- it's 9 inches (229 mm) longer, 6 inches (152 mm) wider, and around 200 pounds (91 kg) heavier. At 52.1 inches (1,323 mm) tall, it's still quite low by modern standards, although interior headroom isn't bad, even in back. Unlike the DS, the spare tire is in the rear, rather than the nose, which cuts into the modest trunk space. The rear is a hatchback, which increases load flexibility, although the lift-over into the trunk is rather high.

A GENTEEL GT

Even by the standards of its time, the SM's objective performance statistics were merely adequate. Although the Maserati V6 bristled with performance feature like dual overhead camshafts, hemispherical combustion chambers, and a trio of two-throat Weber carburetors, it produced an unexceptional 170 net horsepower (127 kW), against which was leveled the big coupe's all-up weight of more than 3,300 pounds (1,500 kg). 0-60 mph (0-97 kph) took around 8.5 seconds, certainly not bad, but no threat to American muscle cars or Italian exotica. Top speed was more impressive; thanks to the aerodynamic profile, the SM could approach 140 mph (225 kph). Its brakes were strong enough, but not dazzlingly powerful, nor did its modest Michelin 195/70R-15 radial tires offer overwhelming levels of grip.

The point of the SM, however, was neither blazing speed nor Fangio-like cornering antics. Its métier was effortless, high-speed cruising for four, with the imperious disregard for rough roads that had become a Citroën hallmark. Although the SM's hydropneumatic suspension was set firmer than that of the DS, its ability to smooth out choppy pavement remained uncanny. The German and Italian GTs may have had more composure over 100 mph (161 kph), but they were far less comfortable at saner velocities than was the Citroën. Only Jaguar's XJ6 sedan truly rivaled the SM's unique combination of poise and plushness.

The SM's handling was almost as controversial as the looks. Some sports cars of this era, particularly Ferraris, thrived on a certain well-placed aggression at the controls, but manhandling an SM was sheer folly. The VariPower system and self-centering action did at least keep you from careening into the weeds if you sneezed at highway speeds, but the lightning-fast steering ratio and total lack of feedback required your full attention in any hasty maneuver. The brakes, operated not by a conventional pedal, but by the Déesse's peculiar, mushroom-shaped rubber button, also demanded a careful touch. Once you got used to it, you could cover ground at a tremendous pace, but driving an SM well meant mastering a new, more delicate set of driving techniques.

FEELING THE PAIN

Despite all those caveats, initial sales were encouraging, particularly given the SM's substantial price tag. It took a few months after the Geneva debut to get the SM in full production, but close to 5,000 were sold in 1971, more than 4,000 the following year. Alas, the SM soon developed a reputation for reliability problems, owing not so much to the complex suspension (which was reliable enough if well maintained, although expensive to repair), but the Italian engine.

The Maserati V6 was, as we mentioned, a sophisticated engine -- all-aluminum, DOHC, and so on. It was admirably compact and impressively light, at only 309 pounds (140 kg). Sadly, it was compromised somewhat by its hasty design. In order to meet the Citroën deadline, Giulio Alfieri's engineers had created the V6 by essentially trimming two cylinders off of their existing V8 engine, shortening the stroke by 5 mm (0.2 in.) to meet the displacement requirement. Like the V8, the angle between the cylinder banks was 90°, fine for an eight-cylinder engine, but resulting in an uneven firing interval in the six. (The ideal angle for a V6 is 60°, but that would have required a completely new design, not sharing the tooling of the V8.) The result was vertical shaking and a rather lumpy idle, not unlike the early Buick V6, which had the same problem. In a rough-and-ready sports car, it might have been fine, but it lacked the kind of pinkie-in-the-air refinement the SM deserved.

1972 Citroën SM dash
Like the DS, the SM had Citroën's unusual single-spoke steering wheel, which helped to kept the wheel from obstructing the gauges. The SM had a very comfortable interior, but it stopped short of the softness of the Déesse, which was noted for its cosseting seats. The SM's fascia was shared with the 1974-1982 Maserati Merak, which also used the SM's V6 engine, five-speed manual transmission, and hydraulic brakes.

Had the engine been reliable, it might not have been so much of a problem, but the V6 soon became the SM's albatross. Period reviewers were widely varied in their descriptions of the engine's sound quality; some found it quiet, others noted a decidedly raucous character and some alarming noises. Those worrisome sounds were a forewarning of a serious problem: weakness of the complex timing chains that drove the V6's overhead camshafts. Many owners found, to their great cost, that ignoring those sounds could have expensive consequences. The oil pump and ignition system were also failure-prone, particularly in cold weather. On U.S. cars, with their EPA-required air-injection pumps, the exhaust manifolds tended to become red hot, causing a rash of under-hood fires. Had the factory addressed these problems in a positive way, they could have been sorted fairly easily, but Citroën reacted with typically haughty arrogance. Buyer confidence was shaken, and SM sales slumped.

THE WRONG PLACE, THE WRONG TIME

In the winter of 1973, OPEC pulled the rug out from under the whole market. In the wake of the Yom Kippur War, Middle East oil producers embargoed deliveries to the West, resulting in widespread shortages and a brief return of fuel rationing. The crisis had a severe impact on the sales of big, thirsty cars -- the rich traditionally care little for the cost of fuel, but when it can't be had at any price, even affluent buyers exercise restraint. (Ironically, the SM was considered frugal by American standards, but Citroën left the U.S. market after 1973, concluding that American sales were too low to justify the cost of federalization.) SM sales tumbled from 2,619 in 1973 to only 294 for 1974.

Citroën, meanwhile, was bleeding money. The company had lost $110 million between 1968 and 1970, mostl of which was attributable to the costs of developing the SM and the new, compact GS. The SM had been an expensive project whose investment was never going to result in high-volume sales (although there had been idle rumors that a four-door, four-cylinder version might eventually replace the DS). To make matters worse, Citroën's latest leap, the Wankel rotary engine developed for the GS Birotor, had proven to be a costly debacle. FIAT, smelling catastrophe on the wind, soon relinquished its stake in the company. By the end of 1974, Citroën was bankrupt, leading to a government-imposed merger with rival Peugeot, completed in 1976.

One of the first casualties of the merger was Maserati, of which Citroën divested itself in May 1975. Another was Robert Opron, the SM's designer, whose tastes were far too outré for the new management. (He went on to Renault, and eventually to Fiat.) The SM was canceled, although its V6 engine and transmission survived in the Maserati Merak. Only 115 1975 SMs were sold before the curtain came down, bringing total production to 12,920.

The demise of the SM (and the Déesse, which also ended production in the spring of 1975) marked the end of an era. Subsequent Citroëns, like the Cx, BX, and Xantia, were still quite eccentric, but they became progressively more vanilla as Peugeot asserted its control.

More than almost any other car -- and even more than any other Citroën -- the SM remains an acquired taste, and a demanding one, at that. A modern Honda Civic sedan would beat it like a gong in almost any objective measurement except absolute top speed. But such comparisons miss the point; the SM is not so much a car as an alternative lifestyle. Nearly every aspect of owning and driving one, from tire-changing to driving over wet, slippery roads, requires a different approach and a different way of thinking than any ordinary car. Whether the Citroën way is better is a matter of preference, not statistics. In a certain sense, it's not unlike contemporary Ferraris, even though the character of the cars themselves could not be more different. As with Ferraris, Citroën owners must adjust to the unique demands of the car, not the other way around; if that's a problem, they might as well sell it and buy a Toyota.

Like any walk on the wild side, the SM could be both rewarding and risky, but it was certainly not bland -- and whatever else, you could never call it square.

# # #

NOTES ON SOURCES

Our sources for this article included Julian Marsh's superb SM page (Julian Marsh, date unknown, Citroënët, http://www.citroenet.org.uk/passenger-cars/michelin/sm/sm-index.html, accessed 27 August 2008), with additional information from Wiljan Cats' Citroën page, (date unknown, Cats-Citroën, http://www.cats-citroen.net/home.html, accessed 30 July 2008); Niels Heilberg, "Citroën Faces" (date unknown, http://www.geocities.com/MadisonAvenue/4430/bluebook.html, accessed 1 August 2008); and "The men and the ideas behind the Car of the Year," Motor Trend, February 1972, reprinted in R.M. Clarke, ed., Citroen SM 1970-1975 Limited Edition Extra (Cobham, Surrey: Brooklands Books, Ltd., 2001), pp. 77-81.

We also consulted the following period road tests: "Toujours L'audace" by L.J.K. Setright (CAR, March 1970); "Technical Analysis: Citroen SM" by Ron Wakefield (Road & Track, July 1970); "Motor Road Test No. 55/70: Citroen SM" (The Motor, 26 December 1970); "Citroën's Super Machine" by John Lamm (Motor Trend, October 1971); "A Totally New Driving Experience" (Road Test, April 1972); "Citroen SM Technical Report" by John Ethridge (Road Test, April 1972); "Citroen SM" (Road & Track, November 1971); "Car of the Year: Citroën SM" (Motor Trend, February 1972); "Citroën SM" (Car and Driver, June 1972); and "Superguide: Citroën SM" (Classic Cars, June 1999); "Berths, deaths & marriages" by Richard Heseltine (Classic & Sports Car, August 1999). All are reprinted in R.M. Clarke, ed., Citroen SM 1970-1975 Limited Edition Extra (Cobham, Surrey: Brooklands Books, Ltd., 2001).

The exchange rate of the dollar to the franc during this period was estimated based on figures from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/EXFRUS.txt, accessed 3 August 2008); the dollar-to-sterling rate was estimated based on data from Werner Antweiler, "PACIFIC Exchange Rate service, Foreign Currency Units per 1 British Pound, 1948-2007" (2007, University of British Columbia, http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca).

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Comments (27)
  • eoers

    Yellow lights used to be a regulation in France, they would not blind drivers coming from the other direction.

  • riko  - A lemon by any other name

    This article brought tears to my eyes. I had the cursed occasion to own a Citroen CX back in the ‘80‘s. It was Star Trek looking too, but the year and a half I had it I was never sure I would get to where I was going-- much less back. It broke down so often I knew the location of every Citroen garage in Paris. None was able to repair the beast, but one mechanic did inform me I should always carry a hammer in the car and when it breaks down start banging away on the underside of the motor with abandon. It usually got it going even if it ruined my pants. The irony of the French word ‘citron’ means lemon was never lost on me.

  • Jerry Hathaway  - 90 deg. V6 can be as smooth as a V8 IF tuned prope

    Dear Mr. Severson I have been working on the SM for a long time and have become quite good at tuning them. Any time you can come by my shop I can let you ride and/ or drive a number of SMs that idle and RPM as smooth as any V8. I have been trying to get Chuck to bring his SM to my shop for a tune for years!!!!
    Best Regards
    Jerry hathaway

  • Administrator

    I know it can be made to run acceptably smoothly if it's sorted properly, and if the engine mounts are in good shape. One interesting factor is that despite the 90-degree layout's uneven firing intervals and the greater magnitude of its shaking forces, the shaking is primarily vertical, so properly tuned engine mounts can soak up a great deal of it -- something Buick figured out for the old Fireball engine.

  • Andrew Brodie

    Hi,

    All these comments on the engine problems are really rather an exaggeration, the French did not consider them bad when new. However, time flies and it was not a low stressed low performance unit like US cars of the time, and nowadays (which always tends to be the comparator) engines are almost fault free and we forget this.

    The engine is actually very robust, and nowadays the minor problems it had are all cheaply fixable. Many have done very high mileage without more than scheduled maintenance.

    And I would like to stress that there is simply nothing that feels as comfortable and fast across country as an SM, it is still in a class of its own. And there are quite a few coming out of the wood work and proving it in competition.

  • Al Grayson

    "Rolls was later forced to license Citroën's self-leveling suspension..."

    Rolls-Royce did not use the full "hydropneumatic" suspension of the Citroën. R-R used only the self-leveling part - hydraulic cylinders over the coil springs. At first these were used on all four springs: 1" rise on the front and 2" (I think) on the rear. Soon the front jacks were deleted as unnecessary.

  • Administrator

    That's an important distinction, yes -- amended.

  • Al Grayson  - The SM's engine

    To bad Citroën did not use a more reasonable engine. Perhaps the P-R-V Douvrin V6? It can be tuned to lots more power than as applied to staid Peugeots, Renaults and Volvos. The Maserati engine was part of the excessive price of the SM. Though expensive, the Douvrin engine might have allowed the SM to have a lower price. Unfortunately for that idea, the PRV was not available until late 1974 near the end of the SM. Also, Citroën was not part of PSA until late 1973, so the PRV V6 would have been an outside sourced component though at least French.
    The engine was tuned for a relatively flat torque graph. Its top speed was limited by the engine going off the "mesa" of the torque graph at just over 140 mph. Though, that was near the beginning of valve float, especially in an engine with age and relaxed valve springs. Due to the close valve-piston clearance, float easily resulted in disaster.
    The hollow-stem sodium filled exhaust valves were unnecessary in what was essentially a highway cruiser. They can cause another valve disaster, broken valve stems. Rebuilders commonly use solid stem stainless exhaust valves.
    Any more speed would also be passing the limit of human judgment of stopping distance, which appears to be around 150 mph. We are just not able to determine the need for emergency stopping far enough ahead for higher speeds. And, even the SM's superb brakes and tires, which Motor Trend found to provide a stopping distance of 106 feet at 60 mph, cannot provide a short enough stopping distance for safety at high speeds (106 feet at 60 mph is more like 400-500 feet at 120 even with no brake fade - in real road conditions this is more like 800-1000 feet at 120). We just cannot see and judge far enough ahead to stop if the road is suddenly blocked. Don't imagine ABS helps, either, as ABS has been shown to increase stopping distances. It helps maintain control so that your car hits the obstacle with the front end rather than with the side or rear. Seat belts and air bags work best in frontal collisions.

  • Administrator

    I'm not convinced the PRV engine would have been a particular improvement, at least in stock form -- witness the DeLorean DMC-12, which used that engine. It would have been cheaper, but in that class, that isn't necessarily a recommendation.

    In retrospect, Citroën might have been better off investing the money spent on Maserati into developing a modern inline engine in the 2-liter class. They needed a new four, and an OHC inline six probably would have better suited the character of the SM.

  • Al Grayson  - Citroen CX?

    "I had the cursed occasion to own a Citroen CX back in the ‘80‘s."

    The first CX I saw was when walking out of the railway station in Frankfort am Main in 1984. It refused to start. I helped its driver to push it off - fortunately it was a manual.

    I drove a CX Prestige for a while in the late '80s. The engine, the thumping I4 of the D, was unfitted to a supposed luxury limo. It shook the car at an idle. Though I drove it up to 115 mph, the engine was always prominent at all speeds. I can't imagine anyone but a committed Citrophile ever wanting an upper-level CX. At the bottom of the range perhaps it compares favorably with other cars in its market segment. Except for unreliability and rust. The CX I drove belonged to the contractor who built Wal-marts and Sam's Clubs. She also had a M-B 560SL. As time went by, she left the CX in the garage and drove the highly refined SL.

  • Al Grayson  - Citroen suicide

    "The company had lost $110 million between 1968 and 1970, mostly of which was attributable to the costs of developing the SM and the new, compact GS."

    Essentially the SM was Citroen's suicide act. It had no potential of ever being profitable. It was based on a chassis that was near its end, having been developed in the early '50s for the D and discontinued in 1975. The engine was a glaring mistake, being totally out of character for a Citroen. People who were attracted to a Maserati wanted a real Mas, not a bastard child of a French family car maker and an Italian racing heritage builders. If not for the SM, Citroen might have been able to keep out of PSA and remain closer to the Citroen heritage. Nevertheless, I loved the SMs I owned.

  • Administrator

    I don't know if I would go that far -- suicide implies a level of deliberation. The decision to buy Maserati was, I suspect, based more on hubris than sense (not unlike Chrysler's ill-fated purchase of Lamborghini 20 years later), certainly, but in the long run, I think the GS Birotor was a bigger mistake. The SM was never intended to be a big-volume car, but the GS was, so the latter's failure was more serious. Citroën really needed a volume seller in the family car market, where the DS and even the ID were too expensive.

    If not for the OPEC embargo, which Citroën had no way of foreseeing when the SM was conceived, it probably could have sold at something close to its initial volume for much of its life. That wouldn't have been a huge moneymaker, but they probably would have broken even, and if things had gone differently, it would have set the style for future sedans.

    As for the chassis being dated, that's a trickier issue. Even by the early seventies, there were few cars at any price that could match the SM's technology. There were areas where it could have used more detail refinement than it got, but this was an era when even many luxury cars had cart-sprung live axles. There were some things about the chassis that were questionable, but many of them were the result of iconoclastic design decisions, rather than being out of date or lacking sophistication.

    It's hairsplitting, I suppose, because if the SM didn't drive Citroën into the arms of PSA, it certainly didn't help.

  • Al Grayson  - The SM - one more blow to solvency

    Looking at Citroën's history, much since the intro of the TA in 1934 has been financially disastrous for the company. Only Michelin's bank accounts and credit kept Citroën alive. Now that C. is part of PSA, I suspect it will gradually become just a form of Peugeot. Other car companies that have tried to advance technology far past the rest of the market have suffered similar problems.
    The more expensive models, but not the very highest priced, are where the profits have been historically. The lower end of the market does well to break even, benefiting the company by getting young people started on the marque, hopefully moving into the more profitable models as their finances improve. Also producing a large quantity of break-even models allows the purchase of vast quantities of materials and parts, giving a volume discount advantage.
    The purchase of Maserati by Citroën resulted in the largest contract for engines or anything Maserati had ever had. Maserati also assembled the transaxles for the SM, shipping the engine-transaxle assembly complete to the Citroën assembly plant.
    The SM could not survive the discontinuance of the D as it was composed largely of D parts and assemblies, some only slightly modified. A perusal of the SM parts manual shows many D part numbers of both individual parts and of major assemblies. The transaxle was only slightly modified from the 5-speed DSuper, etc. box. The front brake calipers were identical to the D ones except for the front mount "ears." The front suspension bearing castings were identical except that one had a hole drilled in it for the manual height control rod. The front arms were almost the same except for larger roller bearing cones. The steering knuckle/bearing assemblies were the same except for the RH-LH threaded hollow spindles and lock rings being reversed. The rear suspension arms were almost alike except that the SM's had no drum brake backplates and had caliper mount brackets welded on. Spheres were almost the same except for the damper settings. The platform frame was of closely related design and construction. Most hydraulic system components were the same or were composed of the same bits.
    "Suicide" ("self-kill") merely means that one did something that resulted in one's death. Homicide ("man-kill") does not imply intent. If I was yakking on my cellphone and absentmindedly stepped out in front of a speeding bus, one's comment might be that I was suicidally negligent without implying that I did it intentionally.
    A long string of bad choices finally did Citroën in as an independent automaker. Some of the choices were bad only in hindsight but were bad nonetheless.
    Yes, the Comotor venture was ill-fated. The world's first Wankel-engined car put its maker, NSU (Audi) on the rocks. Mazda, the only current maker of Wankel-engined autos, makes only one prestige model using the rotary. The Wankel just is too difficult to get to pass emission standards, which are stiffened year by year. It offers no significant advantages over the reciprocating piston engine, at least not that justify its expense.
    The SM's frame structure was composed of a large number of small pieces, spot-welded together. It was not adapted to automated assembly. One-piece underpans spot-welded to other large pressings are the modern way of construction except for really high-end specialty cars, which may use tube construction. The manufacture of the successors to the D, the CX and especially the XM, were much more adapted to automation.

  • Nicolas Daum

    Hi

    May I first correct a mistake in French language: the SM was not a ‘grand routier’ (a ‘routier’ is a truck driver), but a ‘grande routière’ (‘voiture’ and ‘automobile’ are feminine nouns). ;-)

    To me the SM history highlights the issue with Citroën’s philosophy, as well probably as with the other French automakers’: their rationality and their misunderstanding of what a brand is all about.
    They believe that designing a car with a rather potent engine, lots of cutting edge technology, capable of high performance and fairly comfortable makes it a desirable GT or a premium sedan. Renault, Peugeot and Citroën consistently produced high end models until some years ago that consistently flopped. AFAIK Peugeot and Citroën decided they would develop no more.

    In the early 70’s France was busy building its speedways network. It was viewed as the modern age Grail. In his time de Gaulle would personally open any newly completed stretch with a grandiose speech (the press would dub them “mégots d’autoroute” or “speedway butts”). No one would think there would be speed limits one day. The SM was to be the queen of the autoroute: it seemed rational people would routinely travel from Paris to Lyon at 100mph.
    Of course the SM was plagued with the French new models usual shortcomings: incomplete development, poor workmanship and a strange mixture of cutting edge technology and low end solutions. It had taken several years before the DS became fairly reliable. Besides with the German makers, this issue was rather usual in Europe, including with Ferrari.

    I think their biggest mistake was that they never realized you can’t sell in the same dealership a GT and
    that: http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fichier:Citroen2cvtff .jpg
    that: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thum b/8/83/Azu.jpg/180px-Azu.jpg
    or that: http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fichier:Ami_b_club.jp g

    The target customer of a GT expects the badge on his car is not also found on such disgraces as
    that: http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fichier:Citroen_H.JPG
    or that: http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fichier:Belf%C3%A9gor .JPG

    The wannabe prestigious SM did not help selling more 2CVs but the proletarian 2CV did certainly stop prospects for the SM from pushing the door. As you say in your article about the Lexus, the standard Mercedes or Ferrari owner would rather die than be caught in a Citroën dealership. He expects the badge on his new car will proclaim to the masses “I succeeded”. If tin chevrons are displayed on 2CVs, whose statement is “I’m poor”, and on corrugated iron vans, whose statement is “I earn my living by the sweat on my brow”, it’ll a definitely put him off.
    The ID certainly helped amortize the DS investments but I wonder to what point the ID (the poor’s DS) hurt the DS sales. Every single detail on the ID would proclaim “I am not rich enough to afford a DS”: the chevrons on the DS trunk were gilded and they were aluminum on the ID. Many IDs were customized to make them look like DSs, including like the high end Pallas. The only obvious difference was the shift. Pallasized IDs are scorned by today’s DS collectors. It’s during the 60’s that Mercedes and BMW established themselves in France as the preferred premium brands… necessarily at the expense of the only French premium car maker, Citroën.

    The development of the SM was rational, just like the Ford Falcon by McNamara, but they should have known it was not their turf.

    Nick

  • Administrator

    Thanks for correcting my French; I've amended the text. (I speak Spanish, but while I can puzzle out a bit of written French, it's not my best suit...)

    I think you make a good point regarding the relationship between the 2CV and SM. To some extent, it's the same issue Volkswagen faced with the Phaeton; it didn't matter that it was a good car (if not an exceptional one), just that they had the arrogance to charge Mercedes money for a VW badge.

    My understanding with the ID is that it was a half measure to assuage dealer complaints that the Déesse was too expensive. From a marketing standpoint, Citroën needed something for the middle-class family market -- a sort of French answer to the Ford Cortina and Taunus, perhaps -- and the DS was too costly for that, while the 2CV was too cheap and too downmarket. The SM was a fascinating effort, but it was both a branding challenge and the answer to a question no one was really asking...

  • Nicolas Daum

    I forgot to say in my first message how interesting your site is. I like it. Your articles are very informative as well as often funny. Continue with the good job!

    I read that the DS actually frustrated Citroën’s natural customer base, the 11CV owners who liked that one for being simple and rugged, in spite of being more modern than most of its competitors, even in the 50’s. The hydraulic gizmos of the DS put off many Citroënists.
    OTOH one of the rationales for the ID was that the DS sales were much lower than expected. The ID was just for the sake of making volumes for the body and at least part of the hydraulic system, the suspension. But selling a car for the not-so-rich that looked so much like the car for the rich, while looking so dull, wasn’t probably such a great idea.

    Citroën’s traditional strategy was called the ‘economic segments’, which means producing one model for the poor and one for the rich. The 2CV was not only economical, it also looked devastatingly so. They never completely realized what it meant creating a car for the intermediate classes that looked as good as possible whereas Simca and Peugeot succeeded so well in this turf. The model they eventually created, the AMI6, was a bastard.

    The idea behind the SM comes certainly from the incredible arrogance of the management. They were absolutely certain that technology and advertisement were the keys for success and, like with all arrogant people, they didn’t learn from experience.

    Nick

  • Administrator

    I disagree that 2CV buyers represented Citroën's "natural customer base." Citroën wasn't in that market at all before the 2CV debuted in 1948, and it represented a represented a fairly substantial departure. Naturally, it sold better than the Traction, but it was aimed at a completely different market. I really doubt that anyone at Citroën during the development of the DS19 expected that 2CV buyers would somehow trade up to a DS -- any more than anybody at Tata expects Nano buyers to be in the market for a Jaguar XF.

    The DS was intended as a successor to the Traction, which had never been cheap, common, or simple; although its styling was dated by the fifties, a lot of its mechanical design was still quite far out, even discounting the early hydraulic suspension that was eventually offered. (André Citroën would have been proud -- he said on a number of occasions that he hoped that he could develop a car so advanced that it.)

    I don't doubt that some of the buyers who could afford a car like the DS19 were intimidated by the hydraulic system (and for very good reason!). In that respect, Citroën might have been better off offering something like the SM first, because even upscale family-car buyers tend to be wary of novelty. On the other hand, I suspect that if Citroën had been seriously concerned with buyer reaction, the DS19 wouldn't have been built at all. It was a remarkably arrogant product, in that sense -- very much the opposite of the marketing-driven product philosophy that came to dominate Detroit in the sixties and seventies.

    I get the impression that the ID was a very reluctant afterthought, created out of a grudging admission that the DS was too expensive. As you said originally, it felt like a hasty cost-cutting exercise, rather than a solid product concept. The idea of offering a less-complex model to avoid intimidating buyers would have been an entirely reasonable one, but it doesn't seem like Pierre Bercot was ever very worried about intimidating people or polarizing buyer opinion...

  • Nicolas Dau

    I wonder if that post went through. If you already got it, trash that one.

    You misread me ;-). I was not talking about the 2CV, of course, but about the 11CV, its official name, aka “la onze”, aka “la traction avant”, aka “la traction”.
    After WW II, the 11CV didn’t have direct competitors, besides the Peugeot 203 and 403 which were a little lower ranges. The premium car of that time was the Salmson which had a very traditional pre WW II body with a cutting edge DHOC engine and a Cotal gear box. That was fun to drive! The company went bankrupt in the mid 50’s after its coupé version won Le Mans in its category. The 15CV (aka “la quinze”) was not as prestigious, it was just a 11CV on steroids. By then the 11CV was the no-nonsense thing.

    Of course the DS was to succeed the traction.
    I shouldn’t have hinted it put off its whole costumer base but a significant part of it. Anyway the DS was a sensation when it was first unveiled but it didn’t make enough volumes, particularly compared to its initial ambitions: “Véhicule de Grande Diffusion” (hence the ‘D’). Citroën had always had a blind faith in technology as a marketing tool. Pretty much like fins for Harley Earl: the more the better.

    Although it was common that the owners of a new model would spend a lot of time at the garage during the first years to fix bits and pieces, like it had been with the 11CV, the DS was a case especially with its hydraulic gimmicks. The fact the dealers had not been trained for it before made things worse.
    The SM inherited a pretty reliable hydraulic system (after 15 years of tuning on the DS) but the engine was far from being tuned. Conversely, while the DS had inherited the fairly reliable Traction’s engine, it was the hydraulic system that was a mess.

    I think the main issue with the SM was that Citroën, with its brand image, couldn’t sell a premium model. The DS was the car of the bourgeois, the lawyer, the doctor, the executive (as the not-yet-big-cats’ typical company car), the small town’s noteworthy citizen. It was de Gaulle’s favorite. Government agencies had fleets of DSs. There was a special line with the so called “Government finish” that was not distributed through the normal dealerships: an all black, DS looking, exterior and a rather ID interior. Official motorcades were made of those.
    No artist, no star, no success guy had one. They probably “would not be caught dead in a Citroën showroom”. For the young it was the car of the old farts.

    Citroën’s engineers and designers had no clue about what should be a car that’s involving and fun to drive. Creating the SM was like taking an exam for a subject whereas you didn’t attend the class. It was lacking the flair of a GT, what makes it desirable.

    If I may tell my experience. I was born in 1944. My father had ’37 or ’38 11CV Légère he kept until the mid 50’s. He was the paragon of Citroën’s customer base and remained a Citroënist all his life. He was an engineer in the aircraft industry. He had his first DS when I was a teen so my first impressions was as a rear passenger. Compared to his previous cars: fabulous riding comfort on the still rather bumpy roads of the time, excellent rear seat, long leg room (I was getting tall), rear heating vent (the Traction had no heating at all), good silence, better view and the rear windows would completely collapse into the doors. Traveling was no more a torture.

    Then I got my driving license and what a disappointment! The engine was asthmatic, shifting gears was slow, the steering was precise but with no feedback at all, the mushroom-like break pedal was terrible, the weight of your shoe could send you into the windshield. Its driving was not involving at all. You had no feeling whatsoever. Absolute boring.
    I always had the feeling it was heavy. It looks heavy. Its driving feels heavy. Its reactions were slow. It had no anti-roll bar so, with the very soft suspension, it would sway a lot in curves. It made some people sick. And yet it was incr...

  • Administrator

    Okay, I had assumed you were writing IICV (which I've seen people do, although it's not correct), rather than meaning the Onze/Traction. That, I won't disagree with.

    A Car and Driver article in the nineties (on a Mercedes, as I recall) declared, "At some point, you have to shoot the engineers." The DS is kind of a case in point; it was driven by engineering and by a sort of conceptual arrogance, rather than by any sense of who was going to buy it.

  • Nicolas Daum  - re:
    Administrator wrote:
    Okay, I had assumed you were writing IICV (which I've seen people do, although it's not correct)


    It was never spelled that way in France. I also saw it called the 'avant'.

    Citroën was driven by engineers but it’s not the only reason for its demise. They were extremely short sighted. What’s the point of making a car with such good road handling and breaking if you don’t give it the engine that goes with it? How can you pretend taking the executive market with such lousy workmanship?
    There was also the (alas) traditional French lack of commitment to quality and service. In the 70’s when German imports increased the comparison was devastating for Citroën as well as for some others.
    If they had been German engineers things would have been different ;-)

    Nick

  • Administrator

    I wouldn't assume anyone who'd lived in France would write IICV for 2CV, but I have seen Americans do it, albeit incorrectly. On the other hand, it's rare these days to hear the Traction Avant described as 11CV, as well -- just as it's rare to hear someone describe a Buick Super as a Model 50, even though Buick catalogued it as such until the fifties.

    I entirely agree about the build quality. That eventually became a problem for makes like Cadillac, as well -- why spend the extra money for something that's built no better than the average Chevrolet?

  • Nicolas Daum

    The 2CV had a very long career and you see one now and then in the streets whereas the Traction is rather forgotten today.
    Citroën’s communication department is currently trying to create a myth: the 2CV was a big success and it was a cult like the Mini was and like the new Mini is. It’s absolutely wrong. It missed both its targets: the red necks and the blue collars. It was the car people bought if they couldn’t afford anything else or if they didn’t give a damn about their image. It was the country priest’s car, the nun’s. It was the car presented to the middle-class teenager who just got his/her driving license. It was the family second car. My mother had several over the years. Its only virtue was being the cheapest. So people may have good memories associated with their first car: their first dates, their first vacation on their own, etc. No one will tell you they hated and were ashamed of the car they owned, but nobody would keep it and everybody would shift to anything else as soon as they could afford it. That’s what my mother did.
    Yet the 2CV was outsold by practically all the other low end models: the Renault 4CV, the Dauphine and especially the R4, as well as the R8. I think it probably boosted the R4 sales because buying an R4 meant you could afford better than the cheapest. You were not that poor.
    It’s the same logic at both ends of the food chain. Well… all along the food chain. ;-)

    I was appalled by the perceived quality of the Cadillacs. How could they dare put faux wood and cheap leather, not to mention the shoddy plastics?
    Even though my tastes are usually different from everybody else’s, I tend to think ugliness is something objective. Didn’t Cadillac give bad taste a bad name? Isn’t the brand definitely associated with its 50’s and 60’s extravaganzas? How come people go for Mercedes and Lexus?
    Cadillac is currently having the hangover from its excesses.

    Nick

  • Administrator

    This also is a good point. George Romney of AMC said of the Kaiser Henry J (an American compact that was, in its way, nearly as downmarket as the 2CV), "the Henry J was stripped and was identified as a car basically for poor people -- The result was that poor people didn't want it either."

    The 2CV does have one virtue when it comes to manufactured nostalgia, which is that it doesn't look dated in the same way the Traction does. Partially that was because it was made for so many years with minimal changes, partially that it was obviously designed to be minimalist and cheap; you can tell immediately that it's not a new car, but it doesn't exactly belong to any era. The Traction is a much better-looking car, but it looks like a '34 Ford (which was probably not coincidental), so it feels like a product of the mid-thirties.

    Cadillac's fifties and sixties boats were, in the main, reasonably well assembled, with materials better than the American norm. They were not lavish by British standards (U.S. manufacturers eschewed real wood quite early, and vinyl was overtaking leather by the mid-fifties), but they were a clear step up from other American cars in trim. By the seventies and eighties, cost cutting had dragged that down to a rather poor standard, and the assembly quality was becoming grim, as well. It became, at the risk of sounding like a terrible snob, a luxury car designed by and for grocers and butchers, rather than connoisseurs. Its trappings were impressive to people who'd never owned a luxury car before (and indeed, many of its customers were of very modest income), but many customers who had the money and opportunity to compare tended to go German, instead.

  • Nicolas Daum

    If you put aside strictly aesthetic opinions, the SM didn’t look good either: the interior looked cheap, the body shape was flabby, it looked heavy. It had lots of the typically Critroën, supposedly cutting edge but dubiously useful, gimmickry like the triple headlights, the one-spoke steering wheel, the mushroom break pedal. The hatchback line was not a good cue either at that time. OTOH it lacked what makes it desirable, what will make the owner feel his neighbors are jealous for, something exclusive.
    It didn’t look like a performance car at all.
    Anyway, whatever the look, to gain credibility a performance car needs to do well in competition. It was the case with Bentley, Jaguar, Mercedes, Audi, a bunch of prewar French makers and so on. The XK120’s success at Le Mans was the key to the MKII success. The Jaguar brand went gradually downhill after it stopped competition.

    You probably know about Facel Vega, a marque which started from scratch in the 50’s and proved extremely profitable. It was outrageously expensive. It was the car that really stated “I succeeded” to the masses. Yet it was not technologically advanced at all and never entered any competition. Yet it did look like a performance car and it was really luxurious.
    It had something odd. They wanted a wood dashboard like the British marques but didn’t find the way to manufacture it. An employee knew how to do it so it was hand painted faux veneer! It did look good but what if, as a customer, I chipped it and found out the fraud!

    The SM dashboard was real plastic that really looked like plastic! Plastic had gained a noble material status by then (like concrete in architecture) but I’m not certain the actual feel was really right. Yet I’m always surprised how cheap the Ferraris interior looked at that time too. But a Ferrari is a Ferrari.

    I think the 2CV look is not important. It was the car nobody wanted so it’s OK if its style is completely outdated. I think the engineers not only designed it to be cheap but also to look cheap, hence not desirable.

    Nick

  • Al  - 2CV: Yuk.

    I rode in a 2CV once and was NOT impressed. The owner/driver was the former president of the Central Citroen Club, so being a total Citromaniac it was excusable.
    The car was by then old, but it was obvious that it was unrefined and cheep...cheeeeep when new.
    Its strong points were all in the strong, reliable chassis/drivetrain - the body radiated sardine-can quality. Noisy. I would prefer a golf-car.
    The French president's comment when the 2CV was revealed: "Quelle horreur" - "What a horrible thing" - was appropriate. A Panhard Dyna X was refined by comparison.
    The DS/ID (I owned 5 of them) was flimsy above its platform chassis. The doors were barely hung on the hinge pins. How they managed to get them past safety codes until 1976 (last ambulances, last of the D line) with such door hinges and latches is beyond understanding. One I had was sideswiped, which tore the left rear door off by jerking the hinges out of the B pillar. The pillars were so flimsy that a rollover was practically as bad as in a convertible.
    The SM was built to not much better standards of design, construction and build quality than the D. Lots of cheap plastic in the interior despite all USA cars being upholstered in leather. The dash and steering wheel were of a semirigid foam molded with a solid skin of the same material.
    The engines of both the D and the SM shook the cars at idle. The standards of the bottom end Ds were what the entire line was built to.

  • Nicolas Daum

    I rode in a 2CV more than twice and I was consistently impressed: it’s a torture if you have to travel more than ten or twenty miles. The noise first. It was deafening. Unrefined is a euphemism. ;-)
    It has a strong point: it would work always, badly but it would work.

    I had a very long career: 32 years with very little changes but didn’t sell that well. Many Citroën models sold better.

    I’m almost certain it hurt the sales of the SM and the other high end models.

    You are right, Citroën workmanship had always been terrible.
    In the 70’s German imports were getting momentum and Japanese started being seen. Customers begun realizing that they could be treated with better quality. Renault almost got killed but realized in the 80’s that if it was to recover it was by making cars the German way. It took them years to improve. Peugeot was traditionally the best among the French auto makers but it followed the course. Citroën was very slow. Most of their cars of the 80’s were still terrible.

    Nick

  • Zacharias Mulletstein

    Something about the front end of the SM with round headlights makes me think of the 05-09 Mustang GT.

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Last Updated on Thursday, 02 September 2010 13:24